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
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
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The Study of the Great War

A TOPICAL OUTLINE

*with Copious Quotations
and Reading References*

By

PROFESSOR SAMUEL B. HARDING

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Topical Outline of the War

BY SAMUEL B. HARDING, PROFESSOR OF EUROPEAN HISTORY IN INDIANA UNIVERSITY.

PREPARED IN CO-OPERATION WITH THE NATIONAL BOARD FOR HISTORICAL SERVICE AND THE COMMITTEE ON PUBLIC INFORMATION.*

I. FUNDAMENTAL CAUSES OF THE WAR.

I. GENERAL FACTORS.

1. The constitution of the German Empire permits its foreign policy to be determined by the Emperor alone, who is at the same time, by "divine right," King of Prussia—the State which possesses an overwhelming territorial, political, and military predominance in the Empire.

"The Emperor declares war with the consent of the Bundesrat, the assent of the Reichstag not being required. Not even the Bundesrat need be consulted if the war is defensive, and as the Hohenzollerns have always claimed to make defensive warfare it is not surprising that even the unrepresentative Bundesrat was officially informed about the present war three days after the Emperor declared it." (Charles D. Hazen, *The Government of Germany*; Committee on Public Information publication.) (See *War Cyclopedia*, under "Autocracy," "Kaiserism," "William II.")

2. Profit derived from war in the past by Prussia (Germany).

- (a) Through increase of territory (cf. maps).
- (b) Through indemnities (e. g., from France, 1871).
- (c) Through increased prestige and influence. Hence justification of the "blood and iron" policy of Bismarck, and his predecessors. War as "the national industry" of Prussia.

"The Great Elector laid the foundations of Prussia's power by successful and deliberately incurred wars. Frederick the Great followed in the footsteps of his glorious ancestor. . . . None of the wars which he fought had been forced upon him; none of them did he postpone as long as possible. . . . The lessons of history thus confirm the view that wars which have been deliberately provoked by far-seeing statesmen have had the happiest results." (Bernhardi, *Germany and the Next War*, 1911.)

3. Germany's demand for "a place in the sun."

- (a) Meaning of the Kaiser's phrase ("a place in the sun") not clear. It covers vaguely colonies, commerce, and influence in international affairs in proportion to Germany's population, industrial importance, and military power.
- (b) Obstacles. The German Empire was a late-comer in the family of nations; the best regions for colonization and exploitation, especially in the temperate zones, were already occupied by other Powers.
- (c) Examples of the demand. (See *Conquest and Kultur*, secs. 6, 10; *War Cyclopedia*, under "Place in the Sun," "Pan-Germanism," etc.)

"We need colonies, and more colonies, than we have

already, to give vent to our surplus energies without losing them and to make the motherland economically independent." (Manifesto of the Colonial League.)

"We need a fleet strong enough not only to protect the colonies we now have, but to bring about the acquisition of others." (Manifesto of the Navy League.)

"A progressive nation like ours needs territory, and if this cannot be obtained by peaceful means, it must be obtained by war. It is the object of the Defense Association [*Wehrverein*] to create this sentiment." (Lieut.-General Wrochem in speech to the *Wehrverein* in March, 1913.)

"Without doubt this acquisition of new lands will not take place without war. *What world power was ever established without bloody struggles?*" (Albrecht Wirth, *Volkstum und Weltmacht in der Geschichte*, 1904. Quoted by Andler, *Le Pangermanisme continentale*, 1915, p. 308.)

"It is only by relying on our good German sword that we can hope to conquer that place in the sun which rightly belongs to us, and which no one will yield to us voluntarily. . . . Till the world comes to an end, the ultimate decision must rest with the sword." (German Crown Prince, in *Introduction to Germany in Arms*, 1913.)

4. Biological argument for war.

- (a) Darwin's theory of the "struggle for existence" as a chief factor in the evolution of species.
- (b) Development in Germany of the theory that States are of necessity engaged in such a "struggle for existence."
- (c) Hence war is an "ordinance of God for the weeding out of weak and incompetent individuals and States." Corollary: "Might makes right."
- (d) Examples of such arguments from Treitschke, Bernhardi, etc. (See *Conquest and Kultur*, sec. 1, 2, 4; *War Cyclopedia*, under "Bernhardi," "Treitschke," "War, German View;" Vernon Kellogg, "Headquarters' Nights," in *Atlantic Monthly* for August, 1917.)

"War is a biological necessity of the first importance, a regulative element in the life of mankind which cannot be dispensed with, since without it an unhealthy development will follow, which excludes every advancement of the race, and therefore all real civilization. . . . 'To supplant or be supplanted is the essence of life,' says Goethe, and the strong life gains the upper hand. The law of the stronger holds good everywhere. Those forms survive which are able to procure themselves the most favorable conditions of life, and to assert themselves in the universal economy of Nature. The weaker succumb. . . .

"Might gives the right to occupy or to conquer. Might is at once the supreme right, and the dispute

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as to what is right is decided by the arbitrament of war." (Bernhardi, *Germany and the Next War*, 1911, pp. 18, 23.)

"They fight, not simply because they are forced to, but because, curiously enough, they believe much of their talk. That is one of the dangers of the Germans to which the world is exposed; they really believe much of what they say." (Vernon Kellogg, in *Atlantic Monthly*, August, 1917.)

5. Idea of the German mission in the world, and the German demand for world influence and prestige (Pan-Germanism).

(a) Ardent belief in the superiority of the German race and German "Kultur" over all other races and civilizations.

(b) Hence the duty to promote the Germanization of the world, and to oppose the absorption of Germans by other nationalities.

(c) Examples of these ideas in writings of Treitschke, Rohrbach, Bernhardi, etc. (See *Conquest and Kultur*, secs. 1, 2; *War Cyclopaedia*, under "Bernhardi," "Hegemony, German Ambition," "Kultur," "Pan-Germanism," "Treitschke," "William II.")

"I hope that it will be granted to our German Fatherland to become in the future as closely united, as powerful, and as authoritative as once the Roman Empire was, and that just as in old times they said *Civis Romanus sum*, one may in the future need only to say, 'I am a German citizen.'"

"God has called us to civilize the world; we are the missionaries of human progress."

"The ocean is indispensable for Germany's greatness, but the ocean also reminds us that neither on it nor across it in the distance can any great decision be again consummated without Germany and the German Emperor." (Speeches of Emperor William II.)

"The German race is called to bind the earth under its control, to exploit the natural resources and physical powers of man, to use the passive races in subordinate capacity for the development of its Kultur." (Ludwig Woltmann, *Politische Anthropologie*, 1913.)

"If people should ask us whether we intend to become a world power that overtops the world powers so greatly that Germany would be the only real World Power, the reply must be that the will to world power has no limit." (Adolph Grabowsky, in *Das neue Deutschland*, Oct. 28, 1914.)

"By German culture the world shall be healed, and from their experience those who have only heard lies about German culture will perceive, will feel in their own bodies what German means and how a nation must be made up, if it wishes to rule the world." (Benedikt Haag, *Deutschland und der Weltkrieg*, 1914.)

"With the help of Turkey, India and China may be conquered. Having conquered these Germany should civilize and Germanize the world, and the German language would become the world language." (Theodor Springman, *Deutschland und der Orient*, 1915.)

"Our next war will be fought for the highest interests of our country and of mankind. This will invest it with importance in the world's history. 'World power or downfall!' will be our rallying cry." (Bernhardi, *Germany and the Next War*, 1911, p. 154.)

II. MILITARISM AND ARMAMENTS.

1. Definition of militarism. It is a state of mind; not the having of an army, no matter how large, but the exaltation of it to the chief place in the state, the subordination to it of the civil authorities. Joined to this is the reliance upon military force in every dispute. (See *War Cyclopaedia*, under "Militarism," "Prussianism," etc.)

2. Militarism and the military class dominant in Germany.

(a) Historical reasons for this: lack of defensible frontiers; hostile neighbors, etc. Relation also to topics under heading 1.

(b) The Zabern Incident (1913) as a practical example of military domination. (See *War Cyclopaedia*, under "Zabern," "Luxemburg, Rosa.")

(c) Quotations showing German exaltation of war and army, etc. (See *Conquest and Kultur*, secs. 4, 5.)

"Because only in war all the virtues which militarism regards highly are given a chance to unfold, because only in war the truly heroic comes into play, for the realization of which on earth militarism is above all concerned; therefore it seems to us who are filled with the spirit of militarism that war is a holy thing, the holiest thing on earth; and this high estimate of war in its turn makes an essential ingredient of the military spirit. There is nothing that tradespeople complain of so much as that we regard it as holy." (Werner Sombart, *Händler und Helden*, 1915.)

"War is the noblest and holiest expression of human activity. For us, too, the glad, great hour of battle will strike. Still and deep in the German heart must live the joy of battle and the longing for it. Let us ridicule to the utmost the old women in breeches who fear war and deplore it as cruel and revolting. No; war is beautiful. Its august sublimity elevates the human heart beyond the earthly and the common." (*Jung-Deutschland*, official organ of Young Germany, October, 1913.)

"War is for us only a means, the state of preparation for war is more than a means, it is an end. If we were not beset with the danger of war, it would be necessary to create it artificially, in order to strengthen our softened and weakened Germanism, to make bones and sinews." (Ernst Hasse, *Die Zukunft des deutschen Volkstums*, 1908.)

"It is the soldier and the army, not parliamentary majorities and votes, that have welded the German Empire together. My confidence rests with the army." (Emperor William II.)

Otfried Nippold, a University professor and jurist, was shocked to observe, on his return to Europe from a residence of several years in Japan, the extraordinary growth in Germany of militarism and the "jingo" spirit. At the end of a book which he compiled, made up of statements by prominent Germans in 1912-13 advocating war and conquest, he said: "The evidence submitted in this book amounts to an irrefutable proof that a systematic stimulation of the war spirit is going on, based on the one hand on the wishes of the Pan-German League and on the other on the agitation of the Defense Association [*Wehrverein*]. . . . War is represented not merely as a possibility that might arise, but as a necessity that must come about, and the sooner the better. In the opinion of these instigators, the German nation needs a war; a long-continued peace seems regrettable to

them just because it is a peace, no matter whether there is any reason for war or not, and therefore, in case of need, one must simply strive to bring it about. . . The desire of the political visionaries in the Pan-German camp for the conquest of colonies suits the purpose of our warlike generals very well; but to them this is not an end, but only a means. War as such is what really matters to them. For if their theory holds good, Germany, even if she conquered ever so many colonies, would again be in need of war after a few decades, since otherwise the German nation would again be in danger of moral degeneration. The truth is that, to them, war is a quite normal institution of international intercourse, and not in any way a means of settling great international conflicts—not a means to be resorted to only in case of great necessity." (*Der deutsche Chauvinismus*, 1913, pp. 113-117; quoted in *Conquest and Kultur*, 137-139.)

3. The competition in armaments. Europe an "armed camp" following 1871, with universal military service, and constantly increasing military forces and expenditures. The trained forces at the beginning of the war were estimated approximately as follows: Russia, 5,900,000; Germany, 4,000,000; Austria, 4,300,000; France, 3,800,000; Great Britain (including its "Territorials" or trained militia), 772,000.
4. Germany, already the first of military powers, planned a Navy to rival that of England. Her first Naval Bill was introduced in 1898; Great Britain's reverses in the Boer War (1899-1902) greatly stimulated German naval activities.

III. FAILURE OF THE HAGUE PEACE CONFERENCES OF 1899 AND 1907, AND OF THE NAVAL CONFERENCE OF LONDON (1908-9).

1. History of the Hague conferences. Agency of Russia and the United States in calling them. Their positive results in formulating international law and establishing a tribunal at the Hague. (See *War Cyclopaedia*, under "Hague Conferences," "Hague Conventions," "Hague Regulations," "Hague Tribunal.")
2. Plans therein for disarmament and compulsory arbitration defeated by Germany and Austria.
3. General policy of Germany with reference to arbitration. Refusal to enter into an arbitration treaty with the United States. (See *Conquest and Kultur*, secs. 4, 5; *War Cyclopaedia*, under "Arbitration, German Attitude," "Peace Treaties.")
4. British vs. German views of the "freedom of the seas," as revealed at the Hague Conferences and the Naval Conference of London. (See *War Cyclopaedia*, under "Freedom of the Seas," "Declaration of London," etc.)

"The German view of freedom of the seas in time of war was that a belligerent should have the right to make the seas dangerous to neutrals and enemies alike by the use of indiscriminating mines; and that neutral vessels should be liable to destruction or seizure without appeal to any judicial tribunal if in the opinion of the commander of a belligerent war-vessel any part of their cargo consisted of contraband. On the other hand, Germany was ever ready to place the belligerent vessels on the same footing as neutral vessels, and to forbid their seizure or destruction except when they were carrying contraband or endeavoring to force a blockade. In this way she hoped to deprive the stronger naval power of its principal weapon of offense—the attack upon enemy commerce—while preserving for the weaker power

every possible means of doing harm alike to enemy or neutral ships. At the same time she was anxious to secure to belligerent merchant-ships the right of transforming themselves into warships on the high seas." (Ramsey Muir, *Mare Liberum: The Freedom of the Seas*, pp. 8-13.)

IV. SOME SPECIAL SUBJECTS OF INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT.

1. French desire to recover Alsace-Lorraine, taken by Germany in 1871. (See *War Cyclopaedia*, under "Alsace-Lorraine," "Franco-German Rivalry.")
2. Desire of Italy to reclaim its "unredeemed" lands held by Austria. (See *Ibid.*, "Italia Irredenta.")
3. Colonial and commercial rivalry among the Great Powers over Central and Northern Africa (Morocco especially); Asia Minor, Mesopotamia, and Persia; China and the Far East; South America, etc. (See *Ibid.*, under "Morocco Question," "Franco-German Rivalry.")
4. Increased gravity of questions concerning the Balkan Peninsula after the Turkish Revolution of 1908. Plans for Austrian and German domination in these regions (*Drang nach Osten*) conflicted with Russia's desire to secure Constantinople and an outlet to the Mediterranean, and threatened the security of Great Britain's communications with India. (See *Ibid.*, "Balkan Problem," "Drang nach Osten," etc.)
5. Grouping of the Great Powers into the Triple Alliance (1882) and the Triple Entente. Germany's fear of being "hemmed in" (alleged policy of "encirclement"). (See *Ibid.*, "Encirclement, Policy of," "Triple Alliance," "Triple Entente.")
6. The Anglo-German Problem. (See Sarolea, *The Anglo-German Problem*, 1911; *Conquest and Kultur*, sec. 16.) Due to—
 - (a) Menace to Great Britain's industrial and maritime supremacy through Germany's rapid industrial development since 1870.
 - (b) Colonial and trade rivalry in Africa, Asia Minor, Mesopotamia, etc.
 - (c) Hostility to Great Britain taught by Treitschke and others. Doctrine that England was decrepit—"a colossus with feet of clay"—and that her empire would fall at the first hostile touch. Toasts of German officers to "the Day"—when war with Great Britain should come. (See *War Cyclopaedia*, under "Der Tag," "Treitschke," etc.)

"If our Empire has the courage to follow an independent colonial policy with determination, a collision of our interests with those of England is inevitable. It was natural and logical that the new Great Power in Central Europe should be compelled to settle affairs with all Great Powers. We have settled our accounts with Austria-Hungary, with France, with Russia. The last settlement, the settlement with England, will probably be the lengthiest and the most difficult." (Heinrich von Treitschke.)

- (d) Attitude of Great Britain on the whole one of conciliation.
- (e) Failure of the two Powers to arrive at an agreement as to naval armaments and mutual relations. Great Britain proposed (in 1912) to sign the following declaration:

"The two Powers being naturally desirous of securing peace and friendship between them, England declares that she will neither make, nor join in, any unprovoked attack upon Germany. Aggressions upon Germany is not the subject, and forms no part, of any treaty, understanding, or combination to which

England is now a party, nor will she become a party to anything that has such an object."

Germany refused to sign a similar declaration unless Great Britain would agree to *stand aside and be neutral in any war which might break out on the Continent*, i. e., to abandon her new friends, France and Russia, and allow Germany to attack them unhampered by fear of British interference.

V. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION.

For forty years political and economic theories and governmental policies, especially in Germany, had been bringing a great European war ever nearer. Forces making for peace were also in operation, and at times it seemed that these would continue to control the situation. But in 1914 the influences making for war definitely triumphed in Germany and Austria, and precipitated the Great World War.

For reading references on Chapter I, see page 36.

II. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF THE WAR (1870-1914).

I. FOUNDATION AND CHARACTER OF THE PRESENT GERMAN EMPIRE.

1. Franco-German War (1870-71), and the Treaty of Frankfurt. France to pay an indemnity of one billion dollars and to cede Alsace-Lorraine.

2. Formation of the German Empire; its undemocratic character. (See C. D. Hazen, *The Government of Germany*; *War Cyclopaedia*, under "Autocracy," "Bundesrat," "German Constitution," "Kaiserism," "Reichstag.")

(a) The number of States in the Empire is twenty-five, with one imperial territory (Alsace-Lorraine). The list includes four kingdoms, six grand duchies, five duchies, seven principalities, and three free cities. Each of these States has its separate State government, subordinate to that of the Empire.

(b) The king of Prussia is hereditary "German Emperor," with full direction of military and foreign affairs.

(c) The Federal Council (*Bundesrat*) is a council of ambassadors appointed by the rulers of the separate States, and responsible to them. It oversees the administration and initiates most legislation, and is the most powerful body in the Empire. The States are represented unequally in it. Prussia, which contains two-thirds of the population of Germany, has 17 votes out of a total of 61. (If we include the three votes allotted to Alsace-Lorraine in 1911, which are "instructed" by the Emperor, Prussia has 20 votes in the *Bundesrat*.) Bavaria has six votes, Saxony and Württemberg four each, and the other States fewer.

(d) The *Reichstag* is the representative chamber of the legislature. It is composed of 397 members, of whom Prussia elects 236. Representative districts are very unequal in population. "A Berlin deputy represents on the average 125,000 votes; a deputy of East Prussia, home of the far-famed Junkers, an average of 24,000." The members are elected by manhood suffrage for a term of five years; but the Emperor may (with the consent of the *Bundesrat*) dissolve the *Reichstag* at any time and order new elections.

(e) The administration of the Empire is in the

hands of a ministry, headed by the Imperial Chancellor. Unlike the ministers of true parliamentary governments, the German ministers are responsible to the Emperor, and not to the legislative chamber. They do not need, therefore, to resign their offices when defeated in the *Reichstag*.

II. THE TRIPLE ALLIANCE AND THE TRIPLE ENTENTE.

1. The Triple Alliance formed by Germany, Austria, and Italy (1882). Germany's main object was to safeguard herself against an attempt by France to recover Alsace-Lorraine. As France recovered strength Germany plotted new aggressive designs against her.

2. Germany attempted in 1904-05 to form a secret alliance with Russia and France against Great Britain. Failure of the attempt owing to France's unwillingness to give up hope of recovering Alsace-Lorraine. The evidence of this attempt was published in 1917, in a series of letters signed "Willy" and "Nick" which passed between the Kaiser and the Tsar, and which were discovered in the Tsar's palace after his deposition. (See *War Cyclopaedia*, under "Willy and Nicky Correspondence.")

3. Formation of the Triple Entente.

(a) Dual Alliance of France and Russia formed (1891-94) as a counterpoise to the Triple Alliance.

(b) Settlement of England's disputes with France over certain African questions, etc. (1904), and with Russia over Persia, etc. (1907), established the Triple Entente ("good understanding") between those powers.

"France and England were face to face like birds in a cockpit, while Europe under German leadership was fastening their spurs and impatient to see them fight to the death. Then suddenly they both raised their heads and moved back to the fence. They had decided not to fight, and the face of European things was changed." (Fullerton, *Problems of Power*, p. 57.)

III. THREE DIPLOMATIC CRISES: 1905, 1908, 1911.

1. First Morocco crisis, 1905-06. (See *Conquest and Kultur*, 120-126; *War Cyclopaedia*, under "Morocco Question," etc.)

(a) French interests in Morocco; slight interests of Germany.

(b) The Tangier incident. The Kaiser, landing from his yacht in Tangier, challenged France's policy in Morocco.

(c) Delcassé, French Minister of Foreign Affairs, dismissed on Germany's demand. "We are not concerned with M. Delcassé's person, but his policy is a menace to Germany, and you may rest assured we shall not wait for it to be realized." (German ambassador to France, in published interview.)

(d) France brought to the bar of Europe in an international conference at Algieras—which, in the main, sanctioned her Moroccan policy.

(e) The purpose of Germany in this crisis, as in those which follow, was to humiliate France and to test the strength of the Triple Entente. These were struggles to increase German prestige.

2. Crisis over Austria's annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1908. See *War Cyclopaedia*, under "Bosnia-Herzegovina," "Congress of Berlin," "Pan-Slavism," "Slavs," etc.)

- (a) These provinces freed from direct rule of the Turks by Serbia and Russia, but handed over by the Congress of Berlin to Austria to administer (1878).
 - (b) Austria seized the occasion offered by the "Young Turk" Revolution of 1908 to annex Bosnia and Herzegovina, and refused to refer the question to a European congress for settlement.
 - (c) Russia (as yet unrecovered from the Russo-Japanese War) was forced to acquiesce when the Kaiser "took his stand in shining armor by the side of his ally." Humiliating submission imposed on Serbia. (See below, ch. iv, I 2 a.)
3. Second Morocco crisis, in 1911. (See *Conquest and Kultur*, 120-126; *War Cyclopedia*, under "Morocco Question.")

- (a) Agadir Affair: German cruiser "Panther" sent to Agadir as a protest against alleged French infractions of the Algeciras agreement, and "to show the world that Germany was firmly resolved not to be pushed to one side." (Speech of the German Chancellor to the Reichstag.)
 - (b) Great Britain, in spite of political difficulties at home, warned Germany that in case of war she would help France.
 - (c) Adjustment of the Moroccan question. Germany accepted compensation from France elsewhere in return for recognition of French protectorate over Morocco. (Treaty of November 4, 1911.)
 - (d) Furious resentment of the German military party at this outcome. "The humiliation of the Empire is so much the greater, since it is the Emperor himself who had engaged the honor of the German people in Morocco." (*Rheinisch-Westfälische Zeitung*.)
4. Hardening of the German resolve not to accept another diplomatic defeat. "It is not by concessions that we shall secure peace, but by the German sword." (Speech in Reichstag, applauded by the German Crown Prince.)

IV. BAGDAD RAILWAY AND THE "MIDDLE EUROPE" PROJECT CONSTITUTE OTHER GROUNDS OF CONFLICT.

1. Germany supplants England as the protector of Turkey against Russia. Speech of the Kaiser at Damascus, 1898: "The three hundred million Mohammedans who live scattered over the globe may be assured of this, that the German Emperor will be their friend at all times."
2. The Bagdad Railway. Designed to connect Bagdad with Constantinople and the Central European railways. Germany obtains concession from Turkey for its construction in 1902-03. Political as well as economic motives involved. Threat to British rule in India by proposed extension to the Persian Gulf. (See the *President's Flag Day Address with Evidence of Germany's Plans*, note 15; *Conquest and Kultur*, sec. 8; *War Cyclopedia*, under "Berlin to Bagdad," "Corridor," etc.)
3. The "Middle Europe" Project. This may be defined briefly as a plan for "a loosely federal combination for purposes of offense and defense, military and economic, consisting primarily of the German Empire and the Dual Monarchy [Austria-Hungary], but also including the Balkan States and Turkey, together with all the neutral States—Roumania, Greece, the Scandinavian kingdoms, and Holland—that can be drawn within its embrace." (W. J. Ashley, in Introduction to F. Naumann's *Central Europe*, translated by Christabel M. Meridith, 1916.)

The plan includes the domination of this group State by Germany through (a) its control of the common financial and economic policy, and (b) its control of the military forces, based on universal military service. (Compare Prussia's control within the German Empire.) (See *Conquest and Kultur*, sec. 8; *War Cyclopedia*, under "Mittel-Europa," etc.; *The President's Flag Day Address*, notes 15-17.)

4. Union of the Middle Europe project and the Bagdad Railway project in a Berlin-to-Bagdad plan.

"Their plan was to throw a broad belt of German military power and political control across the very center of Europe and beyond the Mediterranean into the heart of Asia; and Austria-Hungary was to be as much their tool and pawn as Serbia or Bulgaria or Turkey or the ponderous States of the East. Austria-Hungary, indeed, was to become part of the central German Empire, absorbed and dominated by the same forces and influences that had originally cemented the German States themselves. The dream had its heart at Berlin. It could have had a heart nowhere else! It rejected the idea of solidarity of race entirely. The choice of peoples played no part in it at all. It contemplated binding together racial and political units which could be kept together only by force—Czechs, Magyars, Croats, Serbs, Roumanians, Turks, Armenians—the proud States of Bohemia and Hungary, the stout little commonwealths of the Balkans, the indomitable Turks, the subtle peoples of the East. These peoples did not wish to be united. They ardently desired to direct their own affairs, would be satisfied only by undisputed independence. They could be kept quiet only by the presence or the constant threat of armed men. They would live under a common power only by sheer compulsion and await the day of revolution. But the German military statesmen had reckoned with all that and were ready to deal with it in their own way." (President Wilson, *Flag Day Address*, June 14, 1917.)

"Across the path of this railway to Bagdad lay Serbia—an independent country whose sovereign alone among those of southwestern Europe had no marriage connection with Berlin, a Serbia that looked toward Russia. That is why Europe was nearly driven into war in 1913; that is why Germany stood so determinedly behind Austria's demands in 1914 and forced war. She must have her 'corridor' to the southeast; she must have political domination all along the route of the great economic empire she planned. She was unwilling to await the process of 'peaceful penetration.'" (*The President's Flag Day Address, with Evidence of Germany's Plans*, note 15.)

- V. TRIPOLITAN AND BALKAN WARS, 1911-13. (See *War Cyclopedia*, under "Balkan Wars," "Constantinople," "Drang nach Osten," "Young Turks.")

1. War of Italy with Turkey over Tripoli (1911-12). Claims of Italy on Tripoli; weakness of Turkey following Young Turk revolution of 1908; unfavorable attitude of Italy's allies (Germany and Austria) to the war as endangering their relations with Turkey. Treaty of Lausanne (Oct. 15, 1912) transfers Tripoli from Turkish to Italian rule.
2. War of Balkan Allies against Turkey (1912-13).
 - (a) Secret league of Greece, Serbia, Bulgaria, and Montenegro to expel Turkey from Europe and

liberate their fellow Christians from Turkish misrule. War declared Oct. 16, 1912.

- (b) Inability of the Great Powers, because of their own divergent aims, to restrain the Balkan allies.
 - (c) Success of the allies. By the Treaty of London (May 30, 1913) Turkey was to surrender all territories in Europe except Constantinople and a small strip of adjacent territory (Enos-Midia line).
3. War among the Balkan Allies (June 30 to Aug. 6, 1913).
- (a) Bulgaria (with Austria's support) attacked her allies as a result of disputes over division of conquered territory.
 - (b) Roumania joined Serbia, Greece, and Montenegro in defeating Bulgaria. Turkey recovered Adrianople.
 - (c) Treaty of Bucharest (Aug. 6, 1913). Most of the conquered territory was given to Greece, Serbia, and Montenegro, though Serbia was denied (through Austrian, German, and Italian pressure) an outlet to the Adriatic. A smaller share was given Bulgaria. Roumania secured a slice of Bulgarian territory. Albania was made a principality under a German ruler.
4. Some wider features of these conflicts:
- (a) A general European war was prevented (though with difficulty) by statesmen of the different countries working through the agency of (1) diplomatic notes, and (2) diplomatic conferences held especially at London. Sir Edward Grey, British Minister of Foreign Affairs, the chief agent in maintaining peace. (See *War Cyclopaedia*, under "Grey, Viscount.")
 - (b) Austrian and German influence was seriously impaired, for they "had guessed badly and supported the losing side—first Turkey and then Bulgaria." Their Balkan domination and Middle Europe project alike were threatened by the events of 1912-13. Corresponding increase of Russian and Serbian power.
 - (c) A new assertion of power on the part of Germany and Austria, principally against Russia and Serbia, to recover the ground lost through the Balkan Wars and the Treaty of Bucharest was made practically certain.

For reading references on Chapter II, see page 36.

III. INDICATIONS THAT GERMANY AND AUSTRIA PLANNED AN AGGRESSIVE STROKE BEFORE JUNE 28, 1914.

I. AUSTRIA PROPOSED AN ATTACK ON SERBIA IN 1913. See *War Cyclopaedia*, under "Austria and Serbia, 1913.")

1. Austria's Proposal to Italy (Aug. 9, 1913—the day before the Peace of Bucharest.)

"Austria has communicated to us and to Germany her intention of taking action against Serbia, and defines such action as defensive, hoping to bring into operation the *causus foederis* of the Triple Alliance. . . ." (Italian Minister of Foreign Affairs, in dispatch of Aug. 9, 1913. Revealed by ex-Prime Minister Giolitti in speech of Dec. 5, 1914. See *Collected Diplomatic Documents*, p. 401.)

2. Italy declined the proposal, as (apparently) did Germany also. The declination of the latter was probably due to the fact that German military preparations were not yet completed. (See below, V 1.)

"If Austria intervenes against Serbia, it is clear that a *causus foederis* cannot be established. It is a

step which she is taking on her own account, since there is no question of defense, inasmuch as no one is thinking of attacking her. It is necessary that a declaration to this effect should be made to Austria in the most formal manner, and we must hope for action on the part of Germany to dissuade from this most perilous adventure." (Reply of Prime Minister Giolitti to above dispatch, *Ibid.*)

II. SECRET MILITARY REPORT ON STRENGTHENING THE GERMAN ARMY (MARCH 19, 1913).

This report came into the possession of the French Minister of War in some unexplained way soon after it was drawn up; it is published in *French Yellow Book*, No. 2; *Collected Diplomatic Documents*, pp. 130-133.

The following extracts occur in the part headed "Aims and Obligations of Our National Policy, of Our Army, and of the Special Organizations for Army Purposes":

1. Minds of the people must be prepared. (See *Conquest and Kultur*, secs. 15-16; *War Cyclopaedia*, under "Pan-Germanism," "Pan-Germans Urge War in 1913," etc.)

"We must allow the idea to sink into the minds of our people that our armaments are an answer to the armaments and policy of the French. We must accustom them to think that an offensive war on our part is a necessity in order to combat the provocations of our adversaries. . . . We must so manage matters that under the heavy weight of powerful armaments, considerable sacrifices, and strained political relations, an outbreak [of war] should be considered as a relief, because after it would come decades of peace and prosperity, as after 1870. We must prepare for war from the financial point of view; there is much to be done in this direction." (*Collected Diplomatic Documents*, p. 131.)

2. "Stir up trouble in the North of Africa and in Russia."

"We must not be anxious about the fate of our colonies. The final result in Europe will settle their position. On the other hand, we must stir up trouble in the north of Africa and in Russia. It is a means of keeping the forces of the enemy engaged. It is, therefore, absolutely necessary that we should open up relations, by means of well-chosen agents, with influential people in Egypt, Tunis, Algeria, and Morocco, in order to prepare the measures which would be necessary in the case of a European war. . . . The first attempt which was made some years ago opened up for us the desired relations. Unfortunately these relations were not sufficiently consolidated." (*Ibid.*, p. 132.)

3. Small states to be coerced. (See *War Cyclopaedia*, under "Neutralized State," "Netherlands, German View," etc.)

"In the next European war it will also be necessary that the small States should be forced to follow us or be subdued. In certain conditions their armies and their fortified places can be rapidly conquered or neutralized; this would probably be the case with Belgium and Holland; so as to prevent our enemy in the west from gaining territory which they could use as a base of operations against our flank. In the north we have nothing to fear from Denmark and Scandinavia. . . . In the south, Switzerland forms an extremely solid bulwark, and we can rely on her energetically defending her neutrality against France, and thus protecting our flank." (*Ibid.*, p. 132.)

4. No guarantee to Belgium for security of her neutrality.

(See *Conquest and Kultur*, sec. 11; *War Cyclopaedia*, under "Belgium, Neutralization of.")

"Our aim must be to take the offensive with a large superiority from the first days. . . . If we could induce these States [on our northwestern frontier] to organize their system of fortification in such a manner as to constitute an effective protection for our flank we could abandon the proposed invasion. . . . If, on the contrary, their defensive organization was established against us, thus giving definite advantage to our adversary in the west, we could in no circumstances offer Belgium a guarantee for the security of her neutrality." (*Ibid.*, p. 133.)

5. Short-term ultimatum to be issued. (See *War Cyclopaedia*, under "Serbia, Austrian Ultimatum.")

"The arrangements made with this end in view allow us to hope that it will be possible to take the offensive immediately after the complete concentration of the army of the Lower Rhine. An ultimatum with a short time-limit, to be followed immediately by invasion, would allow a sufficient justification for our action in international law." (*Ibid.*, p. 133.)

6. Prizes of the war. (See *Conquest and Kultur*, sec. 17.)

"We will . . . remember that the provinces of the ancient German Empire, the County of Burgundy [Franche Comté, acquired by Louis XIV] and a large part of Lorraine, are still in the hands of the French; that thousands of brother Germans in the Baltic provinces [of Russia] are groaning under the Slav yoke. It is a national question that Germany's former possessions should be restored to her." (*Ibid.*, p. 133.)

III. CHANGED ATTITUDE OF THE KAISER: INTERVIEW WITH KING ALBERT OF BELGIUM (NOVEMBER, 1913).

1. Circumstances of the interview; held in the presence of General von Moltke (chief of the German General Staff) and reported to Jules Cambon, the French Ambassador at Berlin, "from an absolutely reliable source." Published in *French Yellow Book*, No. 6; *Collected Diplomatic Documents*, pp. 142-3. (See *War Cyclopaedia*, under "Albert I," "William II," etc.)
2. War with France regarded by the Kaiser as inevitable. (See *War Cyclopaedia*, under "William II, Ambitions.")

"This conversation, it appears, has made a profound impression on King Albert. I [Cambon] am in no way surprised at the impression he gathered, which corresponds with what I have myself felt for some time. Enmity against us is increasing, and the Emperor has ceased to be the friend of peace.

"The person addressed by the Emperor had thought up till then, as did all the world, that William II, whose personal influence had been exerted on many critical occasions in support of peace, was still in the same state of mind. He found him this time completely changed. The German Emperor is no longer in his eyes the champion of peace against the warlike tendencies of certain parties in Germany. *William II has come to think that war with France is inevitable, and that it must come sooner or later.* . . .

"General von Moltke spoke exactly in the same strain as his sovereign. He, too, declared war to be necessary and inevitable, but he showed himself still more assured of success, 'for,' he said to the King [Albert], 'this time the matter must be settled, and your Majesty can have no conception of the irresist-

ible enthusiasm with which the whole German people will be carried away when that day comes.'" (*Collected Diplomatic Documents*, p. 142.)

3. Cambon's comment on the interview.

"As William II advances in years, family traditions, the reactionary tendencies of the court, and especially the impatience of the soldiers, obtain a greater empire over his mind. Perhaps he feels some slight jealousy of the popularity acquired by his son, who flatters the passions of the Pan-Germans, and who does not regard the position occupied by the Empire in the world as commensurate with its power. Perhaps the reply of France to the last increase of the German Army [German army law of 1913, cited below; France met this by increasing her military service from two years to three years], the object of which was to establish the incontestable supremacy of Germany is, to a certain extent, responsible for his bitterness, for, whatever may be said, it is realized that Germany cannot go much further.

"One may well ponder over the significance of this conversation. The Emperor and his Chief of the General Staff may have wished to impress the King of the Belgians and induce him not to make any opposition in the event of a conflict between us. . . ." (*Ibid.*, p. 143.)

IV. GERMAN PUBLIC OPINION AS REPORTED BY FRENCH DIPLOMATIC AND CONSULAR AGENTS (JULY 30, 1913).

(In *French Yellow Book*, No. 5; *Collected Diplomatic Documents*, pp. 136-142.)

1. The Moroccan settlement considered a diplomatic defeat. (See *Conquest and Kultur*, sec. 16.)

" . . . Here is a synthesis of all these opinions: The Treaty of the 4th November is a diplomatic defeat, a proof of the incapacity of German diplomacy and the carelessness of the Government (so often denounced), a proof that the future of the Empire is not safe without a new Bismarck; it is a national humiliation, a lowering in the eyes of Europe, a blow to German prestige, all the more serious because up to 1911 the military supremacy of Germany was unchallenged, and French anarchy and the powerlessness of the Republic were a sort of German dogma." (*Collected Diplomatic Documents*, p. 136.)

2. Forces making for peace.

"There are in the country forces making for peace, but they are unorganized and have no popular leaders. They consider that war would be a social misfortune for Germany, and that caste pride, Prussian domination, and the manufacturers of guns and armor plate would get the greatest benefit, but above all that war would profit Great Britain." Those favoring peace included "the bulk of the workmen, artisans, and peasants, who are peace-loving by instinct," etc. But the classes which prefer peace to war "are only a sort of make-weight in political matters, with limited influence on public opinion, or they are silent social forces, passive and defenseless against the infection of a wave of warlike feeling." (*Ibid.*, p. 137-138.)

3. Forces making for war. (See *War Cyclopaedia*, under "Arbitration, German Attitude," "Disarmament, German Attitude," "German Military Autocracy, Propaganda for War," "Militarism or Disarmament," "Pan-Germans Urge War in 1913," "War, German View," etc.)

"There is a war party, with leaders, and followers, a press either convinced or subsidized for the purpose of creating public opinion; it has means both varied and formidable for the intimidation of the Government. It goes to work in the country with clear ideas, burning aspirations, a determination that is at once thrilling and fixed." (*Collected Diplomatic Documents*, p. 139.) It included the following:

- (a) Those who regard war as inevitable, and hence "the sooner the better."
- (b) Those influenced by economic reasons—"overpopulation, over-production, the need for markets and outlets," etc.
- (c) Those influenced by "Bismarckism." "They feel themselves humiliated at having to enter into discussions with France, at being obliged to talk in terms of law and right in negotiations and conferences where they have not always found it easy to get right on their side, even when they have a preponderating force."
- (d) Those influenced by "a mystic hatred of revolutionary France," and others who acted from "a feeling of rancor."

4. Social classes included in the war party. (See *Conquest and Kultur*, sec. 16; *War Cyclopaedia*, under "Coal and Iron as Cause of War," "German Diplomacy," "Junker," "Peace Terms, German Industrialists on," "Peace Terms, German Opinion as to," "Peace Terms, German Professors on," "Treitschke," etc.)

- (a) The country squires (junkers), who wish to escape the imposition of inheritance taxes ("death duties") "which are bound to come if peace continues. . . . This aristocracy is military in character, and it is instructive to compare the Army List with the year book of the nobility. War alone can prolong its prestige and support its family interest. . . . This social class, which forms a hierarchy with the King of Prussia as its supreme head, realizes with dread the democratization of Germany and the increasing power of the Socialist party, and considers its own days numbered." (*Collected Diplomatic Documents*, p. 140.)
- (b) The capitalist class ("higher bourgeoisie"), including the manufacturers of guns and armor plate, big merchants who demand bigger markets, and all who "regard war as good business." Among these are "doctrinaire manufacturers" who "declare that the difficulties between themselves and their workmen originate in France, the home of revolutionary ideas of freedom—without France industrial unrest would be unknown." (*Ibid.*, p. 140.)
- (c) University professors, etc. "The universities, if we except a few distinguished spirits, develop a warlike philosophy. Economists demonstrate by statistics Germany's need for a colonial and commercial empire commensurate with the industrial output of the Empire. There are sociological fanatics who go even further. . . . *Historians, philosophers, political pamphleteers and other apologists of German Kultur wish to impose upon the world a way of thinking and feeling specifically German.* They wish to wrest from France that intellectual supremacy which according to the clearest thinkers is still her possession." (*Ibid.*, p. 140-1.)
- (d) Diplomats and others "whose support of the war policy is inspired by rancor and resentment."

. . . German diplomatists are now in very bad odor in public opinion. The most bitter are those who since 1905 have been engaged in the negotiations between France and Germany; they are heaping together and reckoning up their grievances against us, and one day they will present their accounts in the war press. It seems as if they were looking for grievances chiefly in Morocco, though an incident is always possible in any part of the globe where France and Germany are in contact." (*Ibid.*, p. 141.)

5. Must war be considered inevitable?

"The opinion is fairly widely spread even in Pan-German circles, that Germany will not declare war in view of the system of defensive alliances and the tendencies of the Emperor. But *when the moment comes, she will have to try in every possible way to force France to attack her. Offense will be given if necessary. That is the Prussian tradition.*

"Must war then be considered as inevitable? It is hardly likely that Germany will take the risk, if France can make it clear to the world that the Entente Cordiale and the Russian alliance are not mere diplomatic fictions but realities which exist and will make themselves felt. The British fleet inspires a wholesome terror. It is well known, however, that victory on sea will leave everything in suspense. On land alone can a decisive issue be obtained." (*Ibid.*, pp. 141-143.)

V. EXTRAORDINARY MILITARY MEASURES OF GERMANY TAKEN BEFORE JUNE 28, 1914. (See *Conquest and Kultur*, sec. 16; *War Cyclopaedia*, under "Egypt," "German Army Act, 1913," "German Intrigue Against American Peace," "Kiel Canal," "Sinn Fein," "South Africa," etc.)

1. Laws of 1911, 1912, and especially 1913, increased the German army in time of peace from 515,000 to 866,000 men. Great increase of machine-gun corps, aviators, etc. Enormous stocks of munitions prepared. Exceptional war tax levied of \$225,000,000. Special war fund (for expense of mobilization, etc.) increased from \$30,000,000 to \$90,000,000.
2. Reconstruction of Kiel canal (connecting Baltic and North Sea) hastened so as to be ready in early summer of 1914. Fortifications of Helgoland, etc., improved.
3. Strategic railways constructed leading to Belgian, French, and Russian frontiers.

"Germany had made ready, at heavy outlay, to take the offensive at a moment's notice, and to throw enormous forces across the territories of two unoffending and pacific neighbors [Belgium and Luxemburg] in her fixed resolve to break through the northern defenses of France, and thus to turn the formidable fortifications of the Vosges. She has prepared for the day by bringing fully-equipped and admirably constructed railways up to her neighbors' frontiers, and in some places across them. . . . An immense sum of money has been sunk in these railways, . . . and there is not the least prospect of an adequate return on them as commercial ventures. They are purely military and strategic preparations for war with France." (See *Fortnightly Review* for February, 1910, and February, 1914, and *New York Times Current History*, I, 1000-1004.)

4. Exportation of chemicals used in making explosives greatly reduced in 1913-14, and importation of horses, foodstuffs, and fats (used in nitroglycerin) greatly in-

creased to provide war stocks. Great purchases of beds and hospital supplies in May, 1914; embargo on stocks of foreign pneumatic tires in Germany; hasty collection of accounts by German merchants; transfer of bank balances, etc., from beginning of July, etc. (See *Le Mensonge du 3 Août, 1914*, pp. 9-10.)

5. Recall of reservists from South America, etc., in May and June, 1914.

6. Exceptional grand manoeuvres of 1914. Ordered in May, these massed "500,000 men in Cologne, the Grand Duchy of Baden, and Alsace-Lorraine for the month of August." (*Le Mensonge du 3 Août, 1914*, p. 9.)

7. Preparations for stirring up revolt in the British Empire.

(a) In South Africa. Reply of the Kaiser (in 1913) to a communication from the future rebel leader, Colonel Maritz: "I will not only acknowledge the independence of South Africa, but I will even guarantee it, provided the rebellion is started immediately." (Speech of General Botha at Cape Town, July 25, 1915. See Rose, *Development of the European Nations*, 5th ed., II, p. 379.)

(b) In British India. On July 8, 1915, indictments were brought in the Federal Court at San Francisco against 98 persons, including German consuls, at which time the Federal District Attorney said: "For more than a year prior to the outbreak of the European war certain Hindus in San Francisco and certain Germans were preparing openly for war with England. At the outbreak of the war Hindu leaders, members of the German consulate here, and attachés of the German Government, began to form plans to foment revolution in India for the purpose of freeing India and aiding Germans in their military operations." The leaders of these defendants plead guilty to the charges against them in December, 1917. (See *War Cyclopedia*, under "German Intrigue Against American Peace.")

"Consideration of all testimony leads to the conviction that the India plot now before the Federal Court here [in Chicago] is but a very small part of the whole conspiracy. . . . The defendants appear to have traveled far and wide in promotion of their alleged work. And always, testimony indicates, German consuls were aware of what was going on and ready to give things a push. Pro-Germanism all over the United States, Canada, Mexico, Brazil, Hawaii, Manila, China, Indo-China, Siam, Java, and various parts of Africa has been brought into the case. No part, according to the testimony, seems to have been detached. All blended into the whole scheme, which is alleged to have had its inspiration and propulsion in Berlin." (*Christian Science Monitor*, October 19, 1917.)

8. Coaling arrangements made for German naval vessels (June 14, 1914).

"A German cruiser, the *Eber*, was in dock at Cape Town a few days before the outbreak of war, and got away just in time. An intercepted letter addressed to the commander contained certain instructions from Berlin, which were dated June 14, 1914. These instructions revealed a complete system for coaling the German navy on the outbreak of war through secret service agents in Cape Town, New York and Chicago.

"The commander of the *Eber* was given the names of shippers and bankers with whom he could deal confidentially, the essence of the plan being that a collier would leave Table Bay [Cape Colony] ostensibly bound for England, but really to meet a German warship at an agreed rendezvous. Naturally, so far as Cape Town is concerned, the arrangements have been upset owing to the discovery, and this, perhaps, explains why German cruisers have been more in evidence in North Atlantic waters than in the southern ocean." (Cape Town correspondent of *London Times*, issue of October 6, 1914.)

VI. CONCLUSION. Before June 28, 1914, Germany willed, if not war, at least another trial of diplomatic strength in which the threat of war should enter as a decisive factor.

"There is a whole category of facts to which we do not, temporarily, attach a decisive importance, for the spirit of mathematics can invoke in its favor the benefit of coincidence. . . . It is a question of various measures taken by Germany (the state or individuals) long before the menace of war was appreciable. . . . Certain persons would see in those measures, of which the war has demonstrated the utility, the proof that Germany had, months before, taken the resolve to launch the European war in 1914. When one has seen the German Government at work, this hypothesis is not extravagant." (*Le Mensonge du 3 Août, 1914*, p. 9-10.)

"Not as weak-willed blunderers have we undertaken the fearful risk of this war. We wanted it. Because we had to wish it and could wish it. May the Teuton devil throttle those whiners whose pleas for excuses make us ludicrous in these hours of lofty experience! We do not stand, and shall not place ourselves, before the court of Europe. Our power shall create new law in Europe. Germany strikes. If it conquers new realms for its genius, the priesthood of all the gods will sing songs of praise to the good war. . . . We are waging this war not in order to punish those who have sinned, nor in order to free enslaved peoples and thereafter to comfort ourselves with the unselfish and useless consciousness of our own righteousness. We wage it from the lofty point of view, and with the conviction, that Germany, as a result of her achievements, and in proportion to them, is justified in asking, and must obtain, wider room on earth for development and for working out the possibilities that are in her. The Powers from whom she forced her ascendancy, in spite of themselves, still live, and some of them have recovered from the weakening she gave them. . . . Now strikes the hour for Germany's rising power." (Maximilian Harden, editor of *Die Zukunft*; see *New York Times Current History*, III, p. 130.)

"It now appears beyond the possibility of doubt that this war was made by Germany pursuing a long and settled purpose. For many years she had been preparing to do exactly what she has done, with a thoroughness, a perfection of plans, and a vastness of provision in men, munitions and supplies never before equaled or approached in human history. She brought the war on when she chose, because she chose, in the belief that she could conquer the earth nation by nation." (Senator Elihu Root, speech in Chicago, September 14, 1917.)

For reading references on Chapter III, see page 36.

IV. THE AUSTRO-SERBIAN CONTROVERSY.

I. INTRODUCTION: PRIOR RELATIONS OF SERBIA, AUSTRIA, AND RUSSIA.

1. Previous history of Serbia: Its fleeting greatness under Stephen Dusan (died 1355); conquered by Turks, 1458; self-governing principality from 1830; independent of Turkey, 1878; territory greatly increased through war with Turkey, 1912-13. Revival in recent years of "Greater Serbia" movement, directed largely against Austria-Hungary, which held Croatia, Bosnia, and Herzegovina, lands which by nationality and speech were Serbian. Compare Piedmont's unification of Italy, against Austrian resistance. (See *War Cyclopedia*, under "Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes.")

2. Serbia's relations with Austria-Hungary.

(a) Political estrangement due to Austria's high-handed annexation of Bosnia in 1908, and the thwarting by Austria and Italy, in 1913, of Serbia's desire for an outlet to the Adriatic. Declaration exacted of Serbia in 1909 (March 31):

"Serbia recognizes that the *fait accompli* regarding Bosnia has not affected her rights. . . . In deference to the advice of the Great Powers, Serbia undertakes to renounce from now onwards the attitude of protest and opposition which she has adopted with regard to the annexation since last autumn. She undertakes, moreover, to modify the direction of her policy with regard to Austria-Hungary, and to live in future on good neighborly terms with the latter." (*British Blue Book*, No. 4; *Collected Diplomatic Documents*, p. 4.)

(b) Tariff disputes over importation of Serbian pigs into Austria-Hungary. A prohibitive tariff was imposed in 1906.

(c) Continued agitation of Serbian revolutionary societies (especially the Narodna Odbrana) against the "dangerous, heartless, grasping, odious and greedy enemy in the north," who "robs millions of Serbian brothers of their liberty and rights, and holds them in bondage and chains." (*Austro-Hungarian Red Book*, No. 19; *Collected Diplomatic Documents*, p. 465.)

(d) German plans for Berlin-Bagdad railway required that Serbia should be controlled by Austria. (See above, ch. ii, IV 4.)

3. Russia's interest in Serbia—founded upon kinship in blood, language and religion, and on Russian aid in the past against Turkey (in 1806-12, 1829-30, 1877-8). This interest was well known, and Austria and Germany recognized that their policy toward Serbia might lead to war with Russia. (See *War Cyclopedia*, under "Pan-Slavism.")

"During the Balkan crisis he [the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs] had made it clear to the Austrian Government that war with Russia must inevitably follow an Austrian attack on Serbia." (Report of British Ambassador to Russia. *British Blue Book*, No. 139; *Collected Diplomatic Documents*, p. 101.)

"We were perfectly aware that a possible warlike attitude of Austria-Hungary against Serbia might bring Russia upon the field, and that it might therefore involve us in a war, in accordance with our duty as allies." (*German White Book*; *Collected Diplomatic Documents*, p. 406.)

II. THE SERAJEVO ASSASSINATION (JUNE 28, 1914).

1. Assassination of the Austrian Crown Prince Franz Ferdinand and his wife, while on an official visit to Serajevo, the capital of the Austrian province of Bosnia. Failure of first attempt at assassination by explosion of a bomb; success of second attempt, some hours later, by revolver shots. The assassins were Austrian subjects of Serbian nationality. (See *War Cyclopedia*, under "Serajevo.")

2. Opportuneness of the crime for Austria. (See Ramsay Muir, *Britain's Case Against Germany*, p. 152.)

III. AUSTRIAN NOTE TO SERBIA (JULY 23, 1914.)

1. Preliminaries: Secret investigation of the crime by the Austrian court at Serajevo. (Reports of the alleged results in *Collected Diplomatic Documents*, pp. 490-4; *Austrian Red Book*, Appendix 8, and *German White Book*, Appendix; summary, pp. 416-7.) Quieting reports as to its intentions issued by Austrian Government, but preparations made in secret for rigorous measures against Serbia.

"A reckoning with Serbia, a war for the position of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy as a Great Power, even for its existence as such, cannot be permanently avoided." (Austrian Minister at Belgrade to Austrian Government, July 21, 1914. In *Austrian Red Book*, No. 6; *Collected Diplomatic Documents*, p. 452.)

2. Conference at Potsdam (July 5, 1914), at which the terms of the Note were practically settled. The holding of such a conference has been denied by German newspapers, but the denial is not convincing. (See *War Cyclopedia*, under "Potsdam Conference;" *New York Times*, *Current History*, September, 1917, pp. 469-471.)

3. General character of the Note. In effect an ultimatum to which unconditional acceptance must be given within forty-eight hours. Humiliating character of its demands. (See *War Cyclopedia*, under "Serbia, Austrian Ultimatum.")

"I had never before seen one State address to another independent State a document of so formidable a character." (Sir Edward Grey, British Secretary for Foreign Affairs, in *British Blue Book*, No. 5; *Collected Diplomatic Documents*, p. 13.)

"The demands of that [the Austrian] Government are more brutal than any ever made upon any civilized State in the history of the world, and they can be regarded only as intended to provoke war." (German Socialist newspaper *Vorwärts*, July 25, 1914.)

4. Some specific demands. The numbers attached are those of the Note itself. (See *British Blue Book*, No. 4; *Collected Diplomatic Documents*, pp. 3-12.)

"2. To dissolve immediately the society called Narodna Odbrana [the chief society for Serbian propaganda], to confiscate all its means of propaganda, and to proceed in the same manner against other societies and their branches in Serbia which engage in propaganda against the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy. The Royal [Serbian] Government shall take the necessary measures to prevent the societies dissolved from continuing their activity under another name and form."

"3. To eliminate without delay from public instruction in Serbia, both as regards the teaching body and also as regards the methods of instruction, everything that serves, or might serve, to foment the propaganda against Austria-Hungary."

"5. To accept the collaboration in Serbia of representatives of the Austro-Hungarian Government for the suppression of the subversive movement directed against the territorial integrity of the Monarchy."

"6. To take judicial proceedings against accessories to the plot of the 28th June who are on Serbian territory; delegates of the Austro-Hungarian Government will take part in the investigation relating thereto."

5. Denial by Germany that she was consulted by Austria before sending the Note.

"We, therefore, permitted Austria a completely free hand in her action towards Serbia, but have not participated in her preparations." (*German White Book; Collected Diplomatic Documents*, p. 406.)

This denial was, and is, generally disbelieved. (See Ramsay Muir, *Britain's Case Against Germany*, p. 8, and the evidence concerning the Potsdam Conference.) Germany's claim that she was ignorant of the Austrian Ultimatum was from the outset preposterous and against all reason. Intimately allied with Austria-Hungary and for a decade the dominating power in the diplomacy of the Central Powers in the Balkans and the Near East, is it possible to believe that she did not examine into and even give direction, in broad outline at least, to the policy of her ally at this critical stage in the development of her Pan-German program? The purpose of the denial, apparently, was to satisfy Italy (Austria's other ally), which certainly was not consulted.

6. Circumstances making a peaceful outcome more difficult: Absence of most of the foreign ambassadors from Vienna for their summer vacations; immediate withdrawal of Austrian Minister for Foreign Affairs to a remote mountain resort, etc., etc.
7. Widespread anxiety over the situation, as threatening the peace of Europe. Russia, England, and France make urgent endeavors:

- (a) To induce Serbia to go as far as possible in meeting the demands of Austria.
- (b) To obtain an extension of the time limit, in order (1) that the Powers might be enabled to study the documentary material promised by Austria embodying the findings of the court at Serajevo; and (2) to permit them to exercise a moderating influence on Serbia. Sharp refusal of Austria to extend the time limit. (For later proposals see ch. v.)

IV. SERBIAN REPLY TO THE AUSTRIAN NOTE (JULY 25, 1914).

(See *British Blue Book*, No. 39; *Collected Diplomatic Correspondence*, pp. 31-37.)

1. To the gratification of Europe, Serbia—

(a) Accepted eight of the ten Austrian demands.

(b) Returned a qualified refusal to the other two.

As to No. 5, the Serbian Government said that they "do not clearly grasp the meaning or the scope of the demand, . . . but they declare that they will admit such collaboration as agrees with the principle of international law, with criminal procedure, and with good neighborly relations."

As to No. 6, they returned a temperate refusal (founded, according to Austrian claim, upon a deliberate misunderstanding of the nature of the demand): "It goes without saying that the Royal [Serbian] Government consider it their duty to open an enquiry against all such persons as are, or even-

tually may be, implicated in the plot, . . . and who happen to be within the territory of the kingdom. As regards the participation in this enquiry of Austro-Hungarian agents or authorities appointed for this purpose by the Imperial and Royal [Austro-Hungarian] Government, the Royal [Serbian] Government cannot accept such an arrangement, as it would be a violation of the Constitution and of the law of criminal procedure; nevertheless, in concrete cases communications as to the results of the investigation in question might be given to the Austro-Hungarian agents."

(c) In conclusion, Serbia suggested reference to the Hague Tribunal or to the Great Powers, in case its reply was not considered satisfactory.

2. Austria (to Europe's amazement) found this reply dishonest and evasive. (See *Austro-Hungarian Red Book*, No. 34; *Collected Diplomatic Documents*, pp. 506-514.)

Two hours after receiving it the Austrian Minister left Belgrade with all his staff. Grave apprehensions were felt that this break of diplomatic relations would be followed by European war.

The Austrian Foreign Minister declared to the Russian Ambassador (July 28) that his Government could "no longer recede, nor enter into any discussion about the terms of the Austro-Hungarian Note." (*British Blue Book*, No. 93; *Collected Diplomatic Documents*, p. 70.)

V. AUSTRIA DECLARES WAR ON SERBIA (JULY 28, 1914).

1. In spite of the efforts at mediation of Great Britain, Russia, and France, Austria declared war on Serbia, July 28, 1914.
2. Demand of Germany that the war be "localized"—i. e., that no other Power interfere with Austria's chastisement of Serbia.
3. Belgrade bombarded, July 29-30, and the war begun.

VI. CONCLUSIONS.

1. Austria and Germany wanted war with Serbia, and their chief fear was lest something might, against their wills, force them to a peaceful settlement; hence the haste and secrecy which attended their measures.

"The impression left on my mind is that the Austro-Hungarian Note was so drawn up as to make war inevitable; that the Austro-Hungarian Government are fully resolved to have war with Serbia; that they consider their position as a Great Power to be at stake; and that until punishment has been administered to Serbia it is unlikely that they will listen to proposals of mediation. This country [Austria-Hungary] has gone wild with joy at the prospect of war with Serbia, and its postponement or prevention would undoubtedly be a great disappointment." (British Ambassador at Vienna, July 27, 1914. In *British Blue Book*, No. 41; *Collected Diplomatic Documents*, p. 38.)

"He [the German Secretary of State] admitted quite freely that Austro-Hungarian Government wished to give the Serbians a lesson, and that they meant to take military action. He also admitted that Serbian Government could not swallow certain of the Austro-Hungarian demands. . . . Secretary of State confessed privately that he thought the Note left much to be desired as a diplomatic document." (British Chargé at Berlin to Sir Edward Grey, July

25, 1914. *British Blue Book*, No. 18; *Collected Diplomatic Documents*, p. 22.)

"In the Viennese note to Serbia, whose brazen arrogance has no precedent in history, each phrase bears witness that Austria-Hungary desired the war. . . . Only a war, for which the best minds of the army were thirsting, . . . could cure the fundamental ills of the two halves of the Austrian Empire, and of the monarchy. Only the refusal and not the acceptance of the claims put forward in the note could have profited Vienna.

"The question has been asked: Where was the plan of campaign elaborated—in Vienna or Berlin? And some hasten to reply: In Vienna. Why do people tolerate the propagation of such dangerous fables? Why not say the thing that is (because it must be), namely, that a complete understanding in all matters existed between Berlin and Vienna." (Maximilian Harden, in *Die Zukunft* for August 1, 1914; quoted in G. Alexinsky, *Russia and the Great War*, 129-130.)

2. Austria's object was to reduce Serbia to a state of vassalage, as a step to Austrian hegemony in the Balkan Peninsula. Her promises not to destroy Serbia's sovereignty, or to annex her territory, therefore, failed to satisfy Serbia's friends.

"Austria demanded conditions which would have placed Serbia under her permanent control." (Prof. Hans Delbrück, a noted professor and statesman of Germany, in *Atlantic Monthly*, for February, 1915, p. 234.)

3. Germany's objects were:
 - (a) To recover her prestige, lost in the Agadir affair (1911) and over the Balkan wars (1912-13).
 - (b) To strengthen her ally Austria, and so increase her own power.
 - (c) To humiliate Russia and the Triple Entente, and to disrupt or render harmless the latter.
 - (d) To promote the Central European—"Berlin to Bagdad"—project, and open a trade route to Saloniki, the most favorably situated seaport for the commerce of Central Europe with the East.
4. To advance these ends Germany and Austria deliberately incurred the grave risk of a general European war.

For reading references on Chapter IV, see page 37.

V. FAILURE OF DIPLOMACY TO AVERT WAR: GERMANY AND AUSTRIA AT WAR WITH RUSSIA AND FRANCE.

I. OUTLINE OF EVENTS, JULY 21 TO AUGUST 6, 1914.

- July 21. Secret orders preliminary to mobilization issued in Germany. These measures, including the movement of troops towards the French frontier, continued up to final mobilization. (See *Le Mensonge du 3 Août, 1914*, pp. 14-25; *Nineteenth Century and After*, issue for June, 1917.)
- July 23. Austrian Note sent to Serbia.
- July 25. Reply of Serbia. Austrian Minister quits Belgrade, severing diplomatic relations.
- July 27. Sir Edward Grey proposed a conference at London on the Serbian question. France, Russia, and Italy accepted; Germany refused.
- July 28. Austria declared war on Serbia.
- July 29. Russian mobilization on the Austro-Hungarian frontier.
- July 30. Bombardment of Belgrade. General mobilization in Russia begun.

July 31. "Threatening danger of war" proclaimed in Germany. German sent ultimatums to Russia and to France.

- Aug. 1. Orders for general mobilization in France and in Germany. Declaration of war by Germany against Russia. Italy declared that she would remain neutral since "the war undertaken by Austria, and the consequences which might result, had, in the words of the German ambassador himself, an aggressive object." *British Blue Book*, No. 152; *Collected Diplomatic Documents*, p. 107.)
- Aug. 2. Occupation of Luxemburg by Germany. Demand that Belgium also permit German troops to violate its neutrality.
- Aug. 3. Belgium refused the German demand. Germany declared war on France.
- Aug. 4. Germany invaded Belgium. Great Britain declared war on Germany.
- Aug. 6. Austria-Hungary declared war on Russia.

II. PROPOSALS FOR PRESERVING PEACE.

1. A conference at London proposed by Sir Edward Grey (July 27). To be composed of the German and Italian ambassadors to Great Britain, as friends of Austria, and the French ambassador and Grey himself, as friends of Russia. Its purpose, to discover "an issue which would prevent complications."

"If it is borne in mind how incomparably more difficult problems had been successfully solved by the conference of ambassadors at London during the Balkan crisis, it must be admitted that a settlement between the Austrian demands and the Serbian concessions in July, 1914, was child's play compared with the previous achievements of the London conference." (*I Accuse*, p. 155.)

The proposal was accepted by Russia, France, and Italy. It was declined by Germany (without consulting Austria) on the ground that she "could not call Austria in her dispute with Serbia before a European tribunal." (*German White Book; Collected Diplomatic Documents*, p. 409.) Grey explained that it "would not be an arbitration, but a private and informal discussion;" nevertheless, Austria and Germany continued to decline.

2. Germany proposed (July 26) that France "*exercise a moderating influence at St. Petersburg.*" The French Foreign Minister in reply "pointed out that Germany on her part might well act on similar lines at Vienna, especially in view of the conciliatory spirit displayed by Serbia. The [German] ambassador replied that such a course was not possible, owing to the decision not to intervene in the Austro-Serbian dispute." (*Russian Orange Book*, No. 28; *Collected Diplomatic Documents*, p. 276.)
3. Germany proposed direct negotiations between Russia and Austria over the Serbian question (July 27). Austria declined these direct negotiations, even though proposed by her ally. (Was this due to collusion between the two Governments?)
4. The Kaiser (who unexpectedly returned to Berlin on July 26 from a yachting cruise) attempted to act as "mediator" between Russia and Austria; but apparently he confined himself to the effort to persuade Russia "to remain a spectator in the Austro-Serbian war without drawing Europe into the most terrible war it has ever seen." (Kaiser to Tsar, July 29, in *German White Book*, exhibit 22; *Collected Diplomatic Documents*, pp. 431-2.)

"Neither over the signature of the Kaiser nor over

that of his Foreign Minister does the record show a single communication addressed to Vienna in the interests of peace." (J. M. Beck, *The Evidence in the Case*, p. 112.)

5. The Tsar proposed, in a personal telegram to the Kaiser (July 29), "to give over the Austro-Serbian problem to the Hague Tribunal." (*Collected Diplomatic Documents*, p. 542.) This telegram is omitted from the *German White Book*. "The acceptance of the Tsar's proposal would doubtless have led to peace, and for this reason it was declined." (*I Accuse*, p. 187, note.)
6. Proposal by Grey (July 29) that Austria should express herself as satisfied with the occupation of Belgrade and the neighboring Serbian territory as a pledge for a satisfactory settlement of her demands and should allow the other Powers time and opportunity to mediate between Austria and Russia.

King George of England, in a personal telegram (July 30) to the Kaiser's brother, said: "I rely on William applying his great influence in order to induce Austria to accept this proposal. In this way he will prove that Germany and England are working together to prevent what would be an international catastrophe." (*Collected Diplomatic Documents*, p. 539.)

Grey's expressed opinion (July 29) was that "mediation was ready to come into operation by any method that Germany thought possible if only Germany would 'press the button' in the interests of peace." (*British Blue Book*, No. 84; *Collected Diplomatic Documents*, p. 64.)

7. Proposal of Russian Foreign Minister (July 30): "If Austria, recognizing that the Austro-Serbian question has assumed the character of a question of European interest, declares herself ready to eliminate from her ultimatum points which violate the sovereign rights of Serbia, Russia engages to stop her military preparations." (*Russian Orange Book*, No. 60; *Collected Diplomatic Documents*, p. 288.)

Reply of German Foreign Minister that "he considered it impossible for Austria to accept our proposal." (*Russian Orange Book*, No. 63; *Collected Diplomatic Documents*, p. 289.)

8. Second Proposal of Russian Foreign Minister (July 31): "If Austria consents to stay the march of her troops on Serbian territory; and if, recognizing that the Austro-Serbian conflict has assumed the character of a question of European interest, she admits that the Great Powers may examine the satisfaction which Serbia can accord to the Austro-Hungarian Government without injury to her rights as a sovereign State or her independence, Russia undertakes to maintain her waiting attitude." (*Russian Orange Book*, No. 67; *Collected Diplomatic Documents*, p. 291.)

This proposal remained unanswered.

9. Austria declared (August 1) that she was then "ready to discuss the grounds of her grievances against Serbia with the other Powers." (*Russian Orange Book*, No. 73; *Collected Diplomatic Documents*, p. 293.)

Sir Edward Grey comments: "Things ought not to be hopeless so long as Austria and Russia are ready to converse." (*British Blue Book*, No. 131; *Collected Diplomatic Documents*, p. 97.) From July 30 onwards "the tension between Russia and Germany was much greater than between Russia and Austria. As between the latter an arrangement seemed almost in sight." (British Ambassador at Vienna, in

British Blue Book, No. 161; *Collected Diplomatic Documents*, p. 117.)

But it was then too late, as Germany had already resolved upon war, and was preparing her ultimatums which precipitated the conflict.

III. GERMAN ULTIMATUMS AND DECLARATIONS OF WAR AGAINST RUSSIA AND FRANCE.

1. A council of war, held at Potsdam on the evening of July 29, apparently decided definitely to make war on France and Russia.

"Our innermost conviction is that it was on this evening that the decision of war was reached. The 5th of July, before his departure for a cruise on the coasts of Norway, the Kaiser had given his consent to the launching of the Serbian venture. The 29th of July he decided for war." (*Le Mensonge du 3 Août, 1914*, p. 38.)

"People who are in a position to know say that those occupying the leading military positions, supported by the Crown Prince and his retainers, threatened the Emperor with their resignation en bloc if war were not resolved on." (*I Accuse*, p. 189.)

2. General mobilization of Russian army (July 30-31). This was grounded not merely on the measures of Austria, but also on "the measures for mobilization [against Russia] taken secretly, but continuously, by Germany for the last six days." (*French Yellow Book*, No. 118; *Collected Diplomatic Documents*, p. 223.)

The Tsar assured the Kaiser: "It is far from us to want war. As long as the negotiations between Austria and Serbia continue, my troops will undertake no provocative action. I give you my solemn word thereon." (*German White Book*; *Collected Diplomatic Documents*, p. 411.)

For evidence of German mobilization against France beginning as early as July 21, see *Nineteenth Century and After*, issue for June, 1917. Consult also *I Accuse*, pp. 194-201; *War Cyclopedea*, under "Mobilization Controversy."

3. German ultimatum to Russia (July 31, midnight) demanding that the Government "suspend their military measures by midday on August 1" (twelve hours).

Demand addressed to France (July 31, 7.00 p. m.) as to "What the attitude of France would be in case of war between Germany and Russia?" (*French Yellow Book*, No. 117; *Collected Diplomatic Documents*, p. 223.) The French Prime Minister answered (August 1, 1.05 p. m.) that "France would do that which her interests dictated." (*German White Book*, exhibit 27; *Collected Diplomatic Documents*, p. 434.)

4. Declaration of war against Russia at 7.10 p. m. on August 1, following Russia's failure to demobilize. (*Russian Orange Book*, No. 76; *Collected Diplomatic Documents*, p. 294.)

Orders for a general mobilization of the French army were signed at 3.40 p. m. the same day.

5. Declaration of war against France on August 3 (*French Yellow Book*, No. 147; *Collected Diplomatic Documents*, p. 240.)

This declaration contained charges that France had already violated German territory (e. g., by dropping bombs from aeroplanes on railway tracks near Nuremberg). These charges are now shown to be falsehoods. (*Le Mensonge du 3 Août, 1914*, pp. 130-230; pamphlet entitled, *German Truth and a Matter of Fact*, London, 1917.) To avoid possible clashes

through hot-headedness of her troops and under-officers, France withdrew her troops 10 kilometers (about six miles) within her own frontiers. On the other hand, German bands repeatedly crossed the French frontier, and even killed a French soldier on French soil before the declaration of war. (*French Yellow Book*, No. 106.)

Similar falsehoods were inserted in the Austrian declaration of war on *Serbia*, and in the German declaration of war on *Russia*. Falsehood and forgery were used with Machiavellian unscrupulousness by Germany in the conduct of her foreign affairs. (Compare Bismarck's changes in the "Ems dispatch" at beginning of Franco-German war and his diabolical pleasure that war with France thus became certain. Bismarck, *Autobiography*, II, p. 101. See *War Cyclopaedia*, under "German Government, Moral Bankruptcy," etc.)

IV. GERMAN RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE WAR.

The testimony is overwhelming not only that Germany planned with Austria an aggressive stroke in 1914, but that in the end it was she who willed the war. (See War Cyclopaedia, under "War, Responsibility for.")

"The constant attitude of Germany who, since the beginning of the conflict, while ceaselessly protesting to each Power her peaceful intentions, has actually, by her dilatory or negative attitude, caused the failure of all attempts at agreement, and has not ceased to encourage through her Ambassador the uncompromising attitude of Vienna; the German military preparations begun since the 25th July and subsequently continued without cessation; the immediate opposition of Germany to the Russian formula [of July 29-31], declared at Berlin unacceptable for Austria before that Power had ever been consulted; in conclusion, *all the impressions derived from Berlin bring conviction that Germany has sought to humiliate Russia, to disintegrate the Triple Entente, and if these results could not be obtained, to make war.*" (Viviani, French Minister for Foreign Affairs, July 31, in *French Yellow Book*, No. 114; *Collected Diplomatic Documents*, p. 221.)

"Never in the history of the world has a greater crime than this been committed. Never has a crime after its commission been denied with greater effrontery and hypocrisy." (*I Accuse*, pp. 208-9.)

"The German Government contrived the war jointly in concert with the Austrian Government, and so burdened itself with the greatest responsibility for the immediate outbreak of the war. *The German Government brought on the war under cover of deception practised upon the common people and even upon the Reichstag* (note the suppression of the ultimatum to Belgium, the promulgation of the German White Book, the elimination of the Tsar's despatch of July 29, 1914, etc.)." (Dr. Karl Liebknecht, German Socialist, in leaflet dated May 3, 1918. See *War Cyclopaedia*, under "Liebknecht on German War Policy.")

"The object of this war [on the part of the opponents of Germany] is to deliver the free peoples of the world from the menace and the actual power of a vast military establishment controlled by an irresponsible government which, *having secretly planned to dominate the world, proceeded to carry the plan out* without regard either to the sacred obligations of treaty or the long-established practices

and long-cherished principles of international action and honor; which chose its own time for the war; delivered its blow fiercely and suddenly; stopped at no barrier either of law or mercy; swept a whole continent within the tide of blood—not the blood of soldiers only, but the blood of innocent women and children also and of the helpless poor; and now stands balked but not defeated, the enemy of four-fifths of the world. *This power is not the German people. It is the ruthless master of the German people.* It is no business of ours how that great people came under its control or submitted with temporary zest to the domination of its purpose; but it is our business to see to it that the history of the rest of the world is no longer left to its handling." (President Wilson's reply to the Pope's peace proposals, August 27, 1917.)

For reading references on Chapter V, see page 37.

VI. VIOLATION OF BELGIUM'S NEUTRALITY BRINGS IN GREAT BRITAIN.

I. WHY GREAT BRITAIN WAS EXPECTED TO STAY OUT.

1. Embittered state of party relations growing out of the Budget struggle of 1909-11, the limitation of the veto of the House of Lords in 1911, violence of the suffragettes ("the wild women"), and the passage by the House of Commons of the Irish Home Rule bill (May 25, 1914).
2. Serious threat of rebellion in northern Ireland (Ulster) against putting in force Irish Home Rule act. Organization of armed forces under Sir Edward Carson; "gun running" from Germany.
3. Widespread labor troubles, especially among the railway workers.
4. Unrest in India, following administrative division of the province of Bengal; boycott movement; revolutionary violence attending Nationalist (Hindu) agitations.
5. Unwarlike character of the British people; a "nation of shopkeepers" supposedly unready for the sacrifices of war. Progress of pacifist opinions ("Norman-Angellism").
6. Lack of an army adequate for use abroad. Composed of volunteers ("mercenaries") instead of being based on compulsory service, it was regarded (in the Kaiser's phrase) as "contemptible."

II. BRITISH DIPLOMACY AND THE WAR.

1. Sir Edward Grey, Secretary for Foreign Affairs, labored unremittingly for peace. (See *War Cyclopaedia*, under "Grey and British Policy, 1914.")

"Sir Edward Grey deserves more than any other the name of the 'peacemaker of Europe.' . . . His efforts were in vain, but his merit in having served the cause of peace with indefatigable zeal, with skill and energy will remain inextinguishable in history." (*I Accuse*, pp. 247-8.)

"No man in the history of the world has ever labored more strenuously or more successfully than my right honorable friend, Sir Edward Grey, for that which is the supreme interest of the modern world—a general and abiding peace. . . . We preserved by every expedient that diplomacy can suggest, straining to almost the breaking point our most cherished friendships and obligations, even to the last making effort upon effort and hoping against hope. Then, and only then, when we were at last compelled to realize that the choice lay between honor and dis-

honor, between treachery and good faith, and that we had at last reached the dividing line which makes or mars a nation worthy of the name, it was then, and only then, that we declared for war." (Prime Minister Asquith, at the Guildhall, London, September 4, 1914.)

"Shoulder to shoulder with England we labored incessantly and supported every proposal," etc. (*German White Book*; in *Collected Diplomatic Documents*, p. 410.) Similar admissions that Great Britain strove sincerely and energetically for peace are found in other passages in the *German White Book*. Later the German Chancellor, von Bethmann Hollweg, declared: "The inner responsibility [for the war] lies on the Government of Great Britain. . . . England saw how things were moving, but did nothing to spoke the wheel." (Speech in Reichstag, December 2, 1914.) This statement, however, is palpably false.

2. British fleet kept together after the summer manoeuvres (July 27). Importance of this step.

"I pointed out [to the Austrian ambassador] that our fleet was to have dispersed to-day, but we had felt unable to let it disperse. We should not think of calling up reserves at this moment, and there was no menace in what we had done about our fleet; but, owing to the possibility of a European conflagration, it was impossible for us to disperse our forces at this moment. I gave this as an illustration of the anxiety that was felt [over the Serbian question]." (Sir Edward Grey, in *British Blue Book*, No. 48; *Collected Diplomatic Documents*, p. 43.)

3. Her liberty of action reserved; Great Britain was free from engagements (July 29).

"In the present case the dispute between Austria and Serbia was not one in which we felt called to take a hand. Even if the question became one between Austria and Russia we should not feel called upon to take a hand in it. It would then be a question of the supremacy of Teuton or Slav—a struggle for supremacy in the Balkans; and our idea had always been to avoid being drawn into a war over a Balkan question. If Germany became involved and France became involved, we had not made up our minds what we should do; it was a case that we should have to consider. . . . We were free from engagements, and we should have to decide what British interests required us to do. I thought it necessary to say that, because . . . we were taking all precautions with regard to our fleet, and I was about to warn [the German ambassador] not to count on our standing aside, but that it would not be fair that I should let [the French ambassador] be misled into supposing that this meant that we had decided what to do in a contingency that I still hoped might not arise." (Sir Edward Grey to the French Ambassador, in *British Blue Book*, No. 87; *Collected Diplomatic Documents*, pp. 65-66.)

4. Germany's "Infamous Proposal" of July 29 (following the Potsdam council of that date, at which war apparently was resolved upon). In return for *British neutrality in case of war between Germany and France*, the German Chancellor promised: (a) Not to aim at "territorial acquisitions at the expense of France" in Europe; (b) a similar undertaking with respect to the French colonies was refused; (c) the neutrality of Holland would be observed as long as it was respected by Germany's adversaries; (d) in case Germany was obliged to violate Belgium's neutrality, "when the war

was over Belgian integrity would be respected if she had not sided against Germany."

"He [the German Chancellor] said that should Austria be attacked by Russia a European conflagration might, he feared, become inevitable, owing to Germany's obligations as Austria's ally, in spite of his continued efforts to maintain peace. He then proceeded to make the following strong bid for British neutrality. He said that it was clear, so far as he was able to judge the main principle which governed British policy, that Great Britain would never stand by and allow France to be crushed in any conflict there might be. That, however, was not the object at which Germany aimed. Provided that neutrality of Great Britain were certain, every assurance would be given to the British Government that the Imperial Government aimed at no territorial acquisitions at the expense of France should they prove victorious in any war that might ensue.

"I questioned his Excellency about the French colonies, and he said that he was unable to give a similar undertaking in that respect. As regards Holland, however, his Excellency said that so long as Germany's adversaries respected the integrity and neutrality of the Netherlands, Germany was ready to give His Majesty's Government an assurance that she would do likewise. It depended upon the action of France what operations Germany might be forced to enter upon in Belgium, but when the war was over, Belgian integrity would be respected if she had not sided against Germany." (British Ambassador at Berlin, in *British Blue Book*, No. 85; *Collected Diplomatic Documents*, p. 64.)

5. This proposal was emphatically rejected by Great Britain. "What he asks us in effect is to engage to stand by while French colonies are taken and France is beaten, so long as Germany does not take French territory as distinct from the colonies." (Sir Edward Grey, in *British Blue Book*, No. 101; *Collected Diplomatic Documents*, p. 77. Compare Germany's attitude over Great Britain's proposal for a naval compact in 1912—see ch. i, IV 6 c.)

The proposals of July 29 may be regarded as "the first clear sign of a general conflict; for they presumed the probability of a war with France in which Belgium, and perhaps England, might be involved, while Holland would be left alone." (J. H. Rose, *Development of the European Nations*, 5th ed., II, p. 387.)

6. Grey holds out the prospect of a League of Peace (July 30). In his reply to the foregoing proposals, the British Foreign Secretary adds:

"If the peace of Europe can be preserved, and the present crisis safely passed, my own endeavor will be to promote some arrangement to which Germany could be a party, by which she could be assured that no aggressive or hostile policy would be pursued against her or her allies by France, Russia, and ourselves, jointly or separately. I have desired this and worked for it, as far as I could, through the last Balkan crisis, and, Germany having a corresponding object, our relations sensibly improved. The idea has hitherto been too Utopian to form the subject of definite proposals, but if this present crisis, so much more acute than any that Europe has gone through for generations, be safely passed, I am hopeful that the relief and reaction which will follow may make possible some more definite rapprochement between

the Powers than has been possible hitherto." (*British Blue Book*, No. 101; *Collected Diplomatic Documents*, p. 78.)

Germany made no reply to the above suggestion.

7. Would Great Britain keep out if Germany respected Belgium's neutrality? (August 1.)

"He [the German Ambassador] asked me [Sir Edward Grey] whether, if Germany gave a promise not to violate Belgium's neutrality, we would engage to remain neutral.

"I replied that I could not say that; our hands were still free, and we were considering what our attitude should be. All I could say was that our attitude would be determined largely by public opinion here, and that the neutrality of Belgium would appeal very strongly to public opinion here. I did not think that we could give a promise of neutrality on that condition alone.

"The Ambassador pressed me as to whether I could not formulate conditions on which we would remain neutral. He even suggested that the integrity of France and her colonies might be guaranteed.

"I said that I felt obliged to refuse definitely any promise to remain neutral on similar terms, and I could only say that we must keep our hands free." (*British Blue Book*, No. 123; *Collected Diplomatic Documents*, p. 93.)

8. Great Britain not to come in if Russia and France rejected reasonable peace proposals; otherwise she would aid France (July 31).

"I said to German Ambassador this morning that if Germany could get any reasonable proposal put forward which made it clear that Germany and Austria were striving to preserve European peace, and that Russia and France would be unreasonable if they rejected it, I would support it at St. Petersburg and Paris, and go the length of saying that if Russia and France would not accept it His Majesty's Government would have nothing more to do with the consequences; but, otherwise, I told German Ambassador that if France became involved we should be drawn in." (Sir Edward Grey, in *British Blue Book*, No. 111; *Collected Diplomatic Documents*, p. 86.)

9. Great Britain gives Naval assurance to France (August 2), following the German declaration of war on Russia (August 1) and the invasion of Luxemburg.

"I am authorized [by the British Cabinet] to give an assurance that, if the German fleet comes into the Channel or through the North Sea to undertake hostile operations against French coasts or shipping, the British fleet will give all the protection in its power." (Sir Edward Grey to the French Ambassador, in *British Blue Book*, No. 148; *Collected Diplomatic Documents*, p. 105.)

This assurance was given as the result of an arrangement of several years' standing whereby the French fleet was concentrated in the Mediterranean and the British by agreement in the North Sea. "It did not bind us to go to war with Germany unless the German fleet took the action indicated." (Sir Edward Grey to the British Ambassador at Paris, in *British Blue Book*, No. 148; *Collected Diplomatic Documents*, p. 105.)

III. NEUTRALITY OF LUXEMBURG AND OF BELGIUM VIOLATED.

1. Luxemburg invaded by German troops (August 2). This was in violation of the Treaty of London (1867),

as well as of her rights as a neutral state in general. (See Hague Convention of 1907, Articles 2-5; *War Cyclopedia*, under "Luxemburg," "Neutral Duties," "Neutrality," "Neutralized State.")

2. Special status of Belgium as a Neutralized State. Based upon the Treaty of London (1839), by which Belgium became "an independent and perpetually neutral state, . . . bound to observe such neutrality towards all other states," and Prussia, France, Great Britain, Austria, and Russia became the "guarantors" of her neutrality. The German Empire was the successor to Prussia in this guarantee. Confirmation of Belgium's neutrality in 1870, by treaties between Great Britain and Prussia and Great Britain and France. (See *War Cyclopedia*, under "Belgium, Neutralization.")

"Had Belgium been merely a small neutral nation, the crime [of her violation] would still have been one of the worst in the history of the modern world. The fact that Belgium was an internationalized State has made the invasion the master tragedy of the war. For Belgium represented what progress the world had made towards co-operation. If it could not survive, then no internationalism was possible. That is why, through these years of horror upon horror, the Belgian horror is the fiercest of all. The burning, the shooting, the starving, and the robbing of small and inoffensive nations is tragic enough. But the German crime in Belgium is greater than the sum of Belgium's misery. It is a crime against the basis of faith on which the world must build or perish." (Walter Lippman, in *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, July, 1917.)

3. German reassurances to Belgium in 1911 and 1914.

"Germany will not lose sight of the fact that the neutrality of Belgium is guaranteed by international treaty." (German Minister of War, in the Reichstag, April 29, 1911. See *Belgian Grey Book*, No. 12; *Collected Diplomatic Documents*, p. 306.)

"The troops will not cross Belgian territory." (German Minister to Belgium, early on August 2, 1914, to Brussels journalists. In H. Davignon, *Belgium and Germany*, p. 7.)

"Up to the present he [the German Minister to Belgium, on August 2] had not been instructed to make us an official communication, but that we knew his personal opinion as to the feelings of security which we had the right to entertain towards our eastern neighbors." (Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, in *Belgian Grey Book*, No. 19; *Collected Diplomatic Documents*, p. 309.)

4. France officially assured Great Britain and Belgium of her resolve to respect Belgium's neutrality (July 31 and August 1), in response to an inquiry addressed by Great Britain to both France and Germany. (*British Blue Book*, No. 115 and 125; *Belgian Grey Book*, No. 15; *Collected Diplomatic Documents*, pp. 87, 94, 307.)
5. Germany declined to give such an official assurance (July 31)—apparently on the ground that "any reply they might give could not but disclose a certain amount of their plan of campaign in the event of war ensuing." (*British Blue Book*, No. 122; *Collected Diplomatic Documents*, p. 92.)
6. Germany demanded (August 2 at 7.00 p. m.) permission to pass through Belgium on the way to France, alleging (falsely) that France intended to march into Belgium, and offering to restore Belgium and to pay an indemnity at the end of the war. Should Belgium oppose the German troops, she would be considered "as an enemy,"

and Germany would "undertake no obligations" towards her. (*Belgian Grey Book*, No. 20; *Collected Diplomatic Documents*, pp. 309-311.)

7. Belgium refused such permission (August 3). "The Belgian Government, if they were to accept the proposals submitted to them, would sacrifice the honor of the nation and betray their duty towards Europe." (*Belgian Grey Book*, No. 22; *Collected Diplomatic Documents*, p. 312.)

8. German armed forces entered Belgium on the morning of August 4. Belgium thereupon appealed to Great Britain, France, and Russia, as guaranteeing Powers, to come to her assistance in repelling the invasion.

9. Germany's justification of her action.

(a) Plea of necessity. "Gentlemen, we are now in a state of necessity, and necessity knows no law. Our troops have occupied Luxemburg and perhaps have already entered Belgian territory. Gentlemen, this is a breach of international law. . . . We know . . . that France stood ready for an invasion [this statement was false]. France could wait, we could not. . . . The wrong—I speak openly—the wrong we thereby commit we will try to make good as soon as our military aims have been attained. He who is menaced as we are and is fighting for his highest possession can only consider how he is to hack his way through." (Chancellor von Bethmann Hollweg, in the Reichstag, August 4, 1914. See *War Cyclopaedia*, under "Bethmann Hollweg," "Kriegs-Raison," "Notwendigkeit.")

(b) Charge that Belgium had violated her own neutrality by concluding military conventions with England in 1905 and 1912 directed against Germany. This claim is based on a willful misinterpretation of documents discovered by Germany in Brussels after the taking of that city. (*Collected Diplomatic Documents*, pp. 350-367.)

"That a wrong was done to Belgium was originally openly confessed by the perpetrator. As an afterthought, in order to appear whiter, Cain blackened Abel. In my opinion it was a spiritual blunder to rummage for documents in the pockets of the quivering victim. . . . To calumniate her in addition is really too much." (Karl Spitteler, a Swiss, quoted in *I Accuse*, p. 234.)

(c) Military expediency was the real reason. This is shown, among other indications, by an interview (August 3, 1914) between the German Minister for Foreign Affairs and the Belgian Minister to Germany.

German Minister: "It is a question of life or death for the Empire. If the German armies do not want to be caught between the hammer and the anvil they must strike a decisive blow at France, in order then to turn back against Russia."

Belgian Minister: "But the frontiers of France are sufficiently extended to make it possible to avoid passing through Belgium."

Foreign Minister: "They are too strongly fortified." (H. Davignon, *Belgium and Germany*, p. 14.)

IV. GREAT BRITAIN ENTERS THE WAR.

1. Appeal of King Albert of Belgium to King George (August 3). "Remembering the numerous proofs of your Majesty's friendship and that of your predecessor, and the friendly attitude of England in 1870 and the proof of friendship you have just given us again, I make a supreme appeal to the diplomatic intervention

of your Majesty's Government to safeguard the integrity of Belgium." (*Belgian Grey Book*, No. 25; *Collected Diplomatic Documents*, p. 313.)

2. Great Britain's ultimatum to Germany (August 4) asking assurance by midnight that "the demand made upon Belgium will not be proceeded with, and that her neutrality will be respected by Germany." (*British Blue Book*, No. 153, 159; *Collected Diplomatic Documents*, pp. 107-109.)

3. War declared by Great Britain (about midnight, August 4). The "scrap of paper" utterance.

The account of the last interview (about 7.00 p. m., August 4) of the British Ambassador with the German Chancellor is instructive: "I found the Chancellor very agitated. His Excellency at once began a harangue, which lasted for about twenty minutes. He said that the step taken by His Majesty's Government was terrible to a degree; just for a word—'Neutrality,' a word which in war time had so often been disregarded—just for a scrap of paper Great Britain was going to make war on a kindred nation who desired nothing better than to be friends with her. All his efforts in that direction had been rendered useless by this last terrible step, and the policy to which, as I knew, he had devoted himself since his accession to office had tumbled down like a house of cards. What we had done was unthinkable; it was like striking a man from behind while he was fighting for his life against two assailants. He held Great Britain responsible for all the terrible events that might happen. I protested strongly against that statement, and said that, in the same way as he and Herr von Jagow [German Foreign Minister] wished me to understand that for strategical reasons it was a matter of life and death to Germany to advance through Belgium and violate the latter's neutrality, so I would wish him to understand that it was, so to speak, a matter of 'life and death' for the honor of Great Britain that she should keep her solemn engagement to do her utmost to defend Belgium's neutrality if attacked. That solemn compact simply had to be kept, or what confidence could anyone have in engagements given by Great Britain in the future? The Chancellor said, 'But at what price will that compact have been kept? Has the British Government thought of that?' I hinted to his Excellency as plainly as I could that fear of consequences could hardly be regarded as an excuse for breaking solemn engagements, but his Excellency was so excited, so evidently overcome by the news of our action, and so little disposed to hear reason that I refrained from adding fuel to the flame by further argument." (*British Blue Book*, No. 160; *Collected Diplomatic Documents*, p. 111. See *War Cyclopaedia*, under "Scrap of Paper.")

4. Great Britain's reasons for entering the war.

(a) Her obligations to Belgium under the treaty of 1839.

(b) Her relations to France growing out of the Entente Cordiale (1904). These ties were strengthened in subsequent years by consultations of British and French naval experts, but no promise of anything more than diplomatic support was given until August 2, 1914.

"We have agreed that consultation between experts is not, and ought not, to be regarded as an engagement that commits either Government to action in any contingency that has not yet arisen and may

never arise. The disposition, for instance, of the French and British fleets respectively at the present moment is not based upon an engagement to co-operate in war.

"You have, however, pointed out that, if either Government had grave reason to expect an unprovoked attack by a third Power, it might become essential to know whether it could in that event depend upon the armed assistance of the other.

"I agree that, if either Government had grave reason to expect an unprovoked attack by a third Power, or something that threatened the general peace, it should immediately discuss with the other whether both Governments should act together to prevent aggression and to preserve peace, and if so, what measures they would be prepared to take in common." (Sir Edward Grey to the French Ambassador, November 22, 1912; see *New York Times Current History*, I, p. 283.)

"There is but one way in which the Government could make certain at the present moment of keeping outside this war, and that would be that it should immediately issue a proclamation of unconditional neutrality. We cannot do that. We have made the commitment to France [of August 2, 1914] that I have read to the House which prevents us doing that." (Sir Edward Grey in the House of Commons, August 3, 1914; *New York Times Current History*, I, p. 289.)

(c) Self-interest—the realization that Germany's hostility to her was implacable, and that if Great Britain was not to surrender her position as a Great Power in the world, and possibly a goodly portion of her colonial possessions, she must ultimately fight Germany; if so, better in alliance with France and Russia than alone at a later time.

5. Great Britain's declared war aims.

"We shall never sheathe the sword which we have not lightly drawn until Belgium recovers in full measure all and more than all that she has sacrificed, until France is adequately secured against the menace of aggression, until the rights of the smaller nationalities of Europe are placed upon an unassailable foundation, and until the military domination of Prussia is wholly and finally destroyed." (Prime Minister Asquith, November 9, 1914.)

"I say nothing of what the actual conditions of peace will be, because those are things which we must discuss with our allies and settle in common with them. But the great object to be attained. . . is that there shall not again be this sort of militarism in Europe, which in time of peace causes the whole of the continent discomfort by its continual menace, and then, when it thinks the moment has come that suits itself, plunges the continent into war." (Sir Edward Grey, House of Commons, January 26, 1916.)

"What we and our allies are fighting for is a free Europe. We want a Europe free, not only from the domination of one nationality by another, but from hectoring diplomacy and the peril of war, free from the constant rattling of the sword in the scabbard, from perpetual talk of shining armor and war lords. In fact, we feel we are fighting for equal rights; for law, justice, peace; for civilization throughout the world as against brute force, which knows no restraint and no mercy.

"What Prussia proposes, as we understand her, is Prussian supremacy. She proposes a Europe mod-

elled and ruled by Prussia. She is to dispose of the liberties of her neighbors and of us all. We say that life on these terms is intolerable. And this also is what France and Italy and Russia say. We are fighting the German idea of the wholesomeness, almost the desirability, of ever recurrent war. Germany's philosophy is that a settled peace spells degeneracy. Such a philosophy, if it is to survive as a practical force, means eternal apprehension and unrest. It means ever-increasing armaments. It means arresting the development of mankind along the lines of culture and humanity. . . .

"The Allies can tolerate no peace that leaves the wrongs of this war unredressed. Peace counsels that are purely abstract and make no attempt to discriminate between the rights and the wrongs of this war are ineffective if not irrelevant.

"... The Prussian authorities have apparently but one idea of peace, an iron peace imposed on other nations by German supremacy. They do not understand that free men and free nations will rather die than submit to that ambition, and that there can be no end to war till it is defeated and renounced." (Sir Edward Grey to correspondent of *Chicago Daily News*, in June, 1916.)

For reading references on Chapter VI, see page 37.

VII. THE WAR SPREADS — CHARACTER OF THE WAR

I. OTHER STATES ENTER THE WAR.

1. Montenegro declares war (Aug. 7, 1914), as an ally of Serbia.
2. Japan declares war (Aug. 23), because of—
 - (a) Alliance with Great Britain (concluded in 1902; renewed in 1905 and 1911).
 - (b) Resentment at German ousting of Japan from Port Arthur in 1895, and German seizure of Kiao-Chau Bay (China) in 1897. Japanese ultimatum to Germany in 1914 modeled on that of Germany to Japan in 1895.
 - (c) Japan captures Tsingtau, on Kiao-Chau Bay (Nov. 17, 1914). Thenceforth her part in the military operations of the war was slight.
3. Unneutral acts of Turkey (sheltering of German war-ships, bombardment of Russian Black Sea ports, Oct. 29, etc.) lead to Allied declarations of war against her (Nov. 3-5, 1914). It is now proved that Turkey was in alliance with Germany from August 4, 1914. (See *N. Y. Times Current History*, Nov., 1917, p. 334-335.)
4. Italy declares war on Austria, (May 23, 1915; on Germany August 27, 1916.) Due in part to—
 - (a) Italy's desire to complete her unification by acquiring from Austria the Italian-speaking Trentino and Trieste (*Italia Irredenta*).
 - (b) Conflicts of interests with Austria on the Eastern shore of the Adriatic.
 - (c) Austria-Hungary's violation of the Triple Alliance agreement by her aggressive policy in the Balkans.
5. Bulgaria, encouraged by Russian and British reverses, and assured by Germany of the much coveted shore on the Aegean, makes an alliance with Austria and Germany and attacks Serbia (Oct. 13, 1915). Great Britain, France, Russia, and Italy thereupon declared war on Bulgaria (Oct. 16-19.) Refusal of King Constantine of Greece to fulfill his treaty with Serbia.

6. Portugal drawn into the war (March 9, 1916) through her long-standing alliance with Great Britain.
7. Roumania, encouraged by Allied successes early in 1916, and treacherously pressed thereto by Russia, attacks Austria-Hungary in order to gain Transylvania (Aug. 27, 1916.)
8. Further spread of the war: United States declares war on Germany, April 6, 1917 (see chapter ix).—Greece deposes King Constantine and joins the Entente Allies (June 12, 1917).—Siam, China and Brazil enter the war against the Teutonic Allies; Bolivia, Peru, Uruguay, Ecuador, etc., sever diplomatic relations with Germany. (See *War Cyclopedia*, under "War, Declarations of.")

II. WORLD-WIDE CHARACTER AND IMPORTANCE OF THE CONFLICT.

1. The most widespread and terrible war in history. A score of countries involved; compare the size of the belligerent areas and populations with those remaining neutral, of the States arrayed against Germany with those on her side.

"At least 38,000,000 men are bearing arms in the war—27,500,000 on the side of the world Allies and 10,600,000 on the side of the Central Powers—according to latest War Department compilations from published reports in various countries. These figures do not include naval personnel strength, which would raise the total several millions. Against Germany's 7,000,000, Austria's 3,000,000, Turkey's 300,000 and Bulgaria's 300,000, are arrayed the following armed forces: Russia, 9,000,000; France, 6,000,000; Great Britain, 5,000,000; Italy, 3,000,000; Japan, 1,400,000; United States, more than 1,000,000; China, 541,000; Roumania, 320,000; Serbia, 300,000; Belgium, 300,000; Greece, 300,000; Portugal, 200,000; Montenegro, 40,000; Siam, 36,000; Cuba, 11,000, and Liberia, 400."—(Associated Press dispatch, Oct. 22, 1917.)

2. Universal disorganization of commerce and industry. Widespread suffering even in neutral countries. Problems of food-supply, coal, and other necessities of life.
3. Importance of the issues involved: Government of the world by negotiation, arbitration, and international law, *vs.* reliance upon military force, and the principle that "might makes right."—Humanity *vs.* "frightfulness."—Democracy and freedom *vs.* autocracy and slavery.

III. INNOVATIONS IN WARFARE DUE TO THE PROGRESS OF SCIENCE AND INVENTION.

1. New developments in trenches and trench fighting. Vast and complicated systems of deep and narrow trenches, inter-communicating; underground refuge chambers of timber and concrete; elaborate barbed wire entanglements; shell craters fortified with "pill boxes" of steel and concrete as gun emplacements. Defended by men with magazine rifles and machine guns; use of hand grenades, trench mortars, sapping and mining; steel helmets and gas masks. "Camouflage," the art of concealment. (See *War Cyclopedia*, under "Barbed-wire Entanglements," "Camouflage," "Trench Warfare," etc.)
2. Great guns (German 42-centimeter mortars, etc.) used

to smash old fashioned steel and concrete fortifications and bombard towns twenty-two miles distant. Enormous quantities of high explosive shell, fired by thousands of guns, for days at a time, used to destroy wire entanglements and trenches. "Barrage" (barrier) shell-fire used to cover attack; definition and use of "creeping barrage"; excellence of French "75's" (quick-fire cannon with calibre of 75 millimeters—about three inches; British "tanks" (huge caterpillar motors, armored and armed with machine guns and rapid-fire cannon); poison gas and liquid fire; etc., etc. (See *War Cyclopedia*, under "Barrage," "Forbidden Methods of Warfare," "Gas Warfare," "Shells," "Tanks," etc.)

3. Great development of aeroplanes for scouting, directing artillery fire, etc. Use of captive balloons. Zeppelins used mainly for dropping bombs on undefended British and French towns; their failure to fulfill German expectations. Devices for combating aerial attacks. (See *War Cyclopedia*, under "Aviation," etc.)
4. Great development of the submarine and submarine warfare. Use of submarines against warships perfectly legitimate; employment against merchant shipping also entirely proper under certain limitations. Devices for combating submarines. (See *War Cyclopedia* under "Submarine," etc.)
5. New problems of transport and communication. Great use of motor trucks and automobiles for moving troops and supplies; increased difficulties of supply owing to great numbers of soldiers engaged, and enormous quantities of shells fired. Use of wireless telegraph and telephone. (See *War Cyclopedia*, under "Motor Transport," etc.)
6. Mobilization of civilian population in all countries and national control of industry, food production and consumption. Increased participation of women in war work. In this conflict not merely armies but nations are engaged against one another; and the side with the greatest man-power, the best organized production and consumption, the largest financial resources, the staunchest courage and the closest co-operation between its allies will win. (See *War Cyclopedia*, under "Civilian Tasks," "Food Control," "Fuel Control," etc.)

IV. EXAMPLES OF GERMAN RUTHLESSNESS AND VIOLATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW.

1. War from the standpoint of International Law.

"From the standpoint of the international jurist, war is not merely a national struggle between public enemies, but a condition of juridical status under which such a conflict is carried on. It consists of certain legal rules and generally recognized customs, most of which have been codified and embodied in international treaties—the so-called Hague Conventions of 1899 and 1907—which nearly all the members of the international community, including Germany, have signed and ratified. Now, if we were to take up the Hague Regulations in detail, we should find that Germany has violated again and again practically all of them. A bare list or enumeration of the proved and well authenticated instances of violation of international law by Germany in this war would, in fact, fill many volumes. If these were accompanied by some description or commentary, I

verily believe that the *Encyclopaedia Britannica* would not contain all of them."—(Prof. A. S. Hershey, in *Indiana University Alumni Quarterly*, October, 1917)

"Germany does not really wage war. She assassinates, massacres, poisons, tortures, intrigues; she commits every crime in the calendar, such as arson, pillage, murder, and rape; she is guilty of almost every possible violation of international law and of humanity—and calls it war."—(*Ibid.*)

2. The German war philosophy. Conception of "absolute war"; ruthlessness and "frightfulness" advocated as means of shortening war, and hence justified as really humane; doctrine that "military necessity" is paramount over every other consideration. International law regarded as a selfish invention of weak states seeking to hamper the strong. Principle of "Deutschland über Alles."

"Whoever uses force, without any consideration and without sparing blood, has sooner or later the advantage if the enemy does not proceed in the same way. One cannot introduce a principle of moderation into the philosophy of war without committing an absurdity. It is a vain and erroneous tendency to neglect the element of brutality in war merely because we dislike it."—(Karl von Clausewitz, *Vom Kriege*, I, page 4.)

"War in the present day will have to be conducted more recklessly, less scrupulously, more violently, more ruthlessly, than ever in the past . . . Every restriction on acts of war, once military operations have begun, tends to weaken the co-ordinated action of the belligerent . . . The law of nations must beware of paralyzing military action by placing fetters upon it . . . Distress and damage to the enemy are the conditions necessary to bend and break his will . . . The combatant has need of passion . . . it requires that the combatant . . . shall be entirely freed from the shackles of a restraining legality which is in all respects oppressive."—(General von Hartmann, "Militärische Notwendigkeit und Humanität," in *Deutsche Rundschau*, XIV, pp. 76, 119-122.)

"Since the tendency of thought of the last century was dominated essentially by humanitarian considerations, which not infrequently degenerated into sentimentality and flabby emotion, there have not been wanting attempts to influence the development of the usages of war in a way which was in fundamental contradiction with the nature of war and its object. Attempts of this kind will also not be wanting in the future, the more so as these agitations have found a kind of moral recognition in some provisions of the Geneva Convention and the Brussels and Hague Conferences . . . The danger that in this way he [the officer] will arrive at false views about the essential character of war must not be lost sight of . . . By steeping himself in military history an officer will be able to guard himself against excessive humanitarian notions; it will teach him that certain severities are indispensable to war, nay more, that the only true humanity very often lies in a ruthless application of them . . .

"Every means of war without which the object of the war cannot be obtained is permissible . . . It follows from these universally valid principles that wide limits are set to the subjective freedom and arbitrary

judgment of the commanding officer."—(Official publication edited by the General Staff, *Kriegsbrauch im Landkriege*; in translation by J. H. Morgan entitled *The German War Book*, pp. 54-55, 64.)

All the foregoing extracts are quoted in E. Lavisse and C. Andler, *German Theory and Practice of War*, pp. 25-29. See also, D. C. Munro, *German War Practices*, Introduction; *War Cyclopaedia*, under "Frightfulness," "Kriegs-Raison," "Notwendigkeit," "War, German Ruthlessness," "War, German View," etc.; Garner and Scott, *German War Code*.

3. German treatment of Belgium and other occupied territories (Northern France, Russian Poland, Serbia, etc). Evidence found in captured letters and diaries of German soldiers and in proclamations of German commanders, as well as in testimony of victims and witnesses. The violations of international law and the laws of humanity include:—

- (a) Deliberate and systematic massacre of portions of the civil population, as a means of preventing or punishing resistance. Individual citizens murdered (some while hostages); women abused, and children brutally slain. Several thousand persons were so killed, often with mutilation and torture. (See Munro, *German War Practices*; *War Cyclopaedia*, under "Hostages," "Non-combatants," etc.)

"Outrages of this kind [against the lives and property of the civil population] were committed during the whole advance and retreat of the Germans through Belgium and France, and only abated when open manoeuvring gave place to trench warfare along all the line from Switzerland to the sea. Similar outrages accompanied the simultaneous advance into the western salient of Russian Poland, and the autumn incursion of the Austro-Hungarians into Serbia, which was turned back at Valievo. There was a remarkable uniformity in the crimes committed in these widely separated theaters of war, and an equally remarkable limit to the dates within which they fell. They all occurred during the first three months of the war, while, since that period, though outrages have continued, they have not been of the same character or on the same scale. This has not been due to the immobility of the fronts, for although it is certainly true that the Germans have been unable to overrun fresh territories on the west, they have carried out greater invasions than ever in Russia and the Balkans, which have not been marked by outrages of the same specific kind. This seems to show that the systematic warfare against the civil population in the campaigns of 1914 was the result of policy, deliberately tried and afterwards deliberately given up." (J. Arnold Toynbee, *The German Terror in Belgium*, pp. 15-16.)

- (b) Looting, burning of houses and whole villages, and wanton destruction of property ordered and countenanced by German officers. Provision for systematic incendiarism a part of German military preparations. (See Munro, *German War Practices*; *War Cyclopaedia*, under "Belgium, Estates Destroyed," "Belgium's Woe," "Family Honor and Rights of Property," "Pillage," etc.)

"It is forbidden to pillage a town or locality even when taken by assault . . . [In occupied territory] pillage is forbidden."—(Hague Convention of 1907, Articles 28 and 47.)

- (c) Excessive taxes (\$12,000,000) a month, and heavy fines on cities and provinces, laid upon Belgium. Belgium robbed of its industrial and agricultural machinery, together with its stocks of food stuffs and raw materials, which were sent into Germany or converted to the use of the German army. This was according to a "plan elaborated by Dr. W. Rathenau in 1914 at Berlin, for the systematic exploitation of all the economic resources of occupied countries in favor of the military organization of the Empire." (See Munro, *German War Practices, Part II; War Cyclopedia*, under "Belgium, Economic Destruction," "Contributions," "Requisitions.")

"[1] Coal, minerals, metals, chemical products; wood and various building materials; wool, flax, cotton and other materials for weaving; leathers, hides and rubber, all in every possible state of industrial transformation, from the raw material to the commercial product and the waste; [2] further, all machines, fixed and movable, and machine-tools (in particular, the American lathes which it is impossible to replace at present); transmission belts; wires for electric lighting and motor power; oils and grease products; [3] transport material, whether by road, railway or water, and an important part of the rolling-stock of local railway lines; all traction power, whether animal or mechanical; thorough-breds and stud animals, and the products of breeding; [4] agricultural products, seed and harvests, etc.,—were successively immobilized, and then seized and removed from the country, as a result of legislative acts on the part of the civil authorities, following upon innumerable requisitions by the military authorities. The value of these seizures and requisitions amounts to billions of francs . . .

Moreover, many of the measures taken were inspired not only by the motives of military interest denounced above, but by the underlying thought of crushing the commercial rivalry of Belgium. This was explicitly admitted in Germany itself by several authorities."—(*Memorandum of the Belgian Government on the Deportations, etc.*, February 1, 1917, pp. 7-8.)

The total exactions from Belgium, in money and materials, are computed to be "in excess of one billion dollars, or nearly five times as much as all the world has contributed to keep the Belgian people from starving to death."—(S. S. McClure, *Obstacles to Peace*, page 116.)

- (d) Forcible deportation of tens of thousands of Belgian and other civilians to Germany, the men to serve practically as slaves in Germany's industries, and the women reduced frequently to worse than slavery. (See Munro, *German War Practices; War Cyclopedia*, under "Belgium, Deportations.")

"They [the Germans] have dealt a mortal blow to any prospect they may ever have had of being tolerated by the population of Flanders [which they were seeking to alienate from French-speaking Belgium]; in tearing away from nearly every humble home in the land a husband and a father or a son and brother, they have lighted a fire of hatred that will never go out; they have brought home to every heart in the land, in a way that will impress its horror indelibly on the memory

of three generations, a realization of what German methods mean—not, as with the early atrocities, in the heat of passion and the first lust of war, but by one of those deeds that make one despair of the future of the human race, a deed coldly planned, studiously matured, and deliberately and systematically executed, a deed so cruel that German soldiers are said to have wept in its execution, and so monstrous that even German soldiers are now said to be ashamed."—(U. S. Minister Brand Whitlock, in January, 1917.)

- (e) Fearful devastation of part of Northern France during Hindenburg's "strategic retreat" (March, 1917), including complete destruction of villages and homesteads, systematic destruction of vineyards and fruit trees, etc. (See Munro, *German War Practices; War Cyclopedia*, under "Destruction," "Frightfulness," "Hindenburg Line.")

"In the course of these last months, great stretches of French territory have been turned by us into a dead country. It varies in width from 10 to 12 or 15 kilometers [$6\frac{1}{4}$ to $7\frac{1}{2}$ or 8 miles], and extends along the whole of our new position, presenting a terrible barrier of desolation to any enemy hardy enough to advance against our new lines. No village or farm was left standing on this glacis, no road was left passable, no railway track or embankment was left in being. Where once were woods there are gaunt rows of stumps; the wells have been blown up; wires, cables, and pipelines destroyed. In front of our new positions runs, like a gigantic ribbon, an empire of death."—(Berlin *Lokal-anzeiger*, March 18, 1917; quoted in *Frightfulness in Retreat*, page 5.)

"Whole towns and villages have been pillaged, burnt and destroyed; private houses have been stripped of all their furniture, which the enemy has carried off; fruit trees have been torn up or rendered useless for all future production; springs and wells have been poisoned. The comparatively few inhabitants who were not deported to the rear were left with the smallest possible ration of food, while the enemy took possession of the stocks provided by the Neutral Relief Committee and intended for the civil population . . . It is a question not of acts aimed at hampering the operations of the Allied armies, but of acts of devastation which have no connection with that object, and the aim of which is to ruin for many years to come one of the most fertile regions of France.—(Protest of the French Government to Neutral Powers, in *Frightfulness in Retreat*, pp. 6-7.)

- (f) Wanton destruction of historic works of art—library of Louvain; cathedrals of Rheims, Soissons, Ypres, Arras, St. Quentin; castle of Coucy; town halls, etc. of Ypres and other Belgian cities. (See *War Cyclopedia*, under "Louvain," "Rheims," "Works of Art," etc.)

4. Other violations of the laws of warfare on land.

- (a) Use of poison gas and liquid fire (both first used by the Germans); poisoning of wells; intentional dissemination of disease germs (anthrax and glanders, at Bucharest, etc.); bombardment of undefended towns by Zeppelins, aeroplanes, and cruisers; bombardment of hospitals, etc. (See *War Cyclopedia*, under "Bombardment," "Explosives from Aircraft," "Forbidden Weapons," "Gas Warfare,"

"Poisons," "Roumania, German Treachery in," "Zeppelins," etc.)

- (b) Civilians, including women and children, used as a screen by German forces; frequent abuse of Red Cross and white flag. (See Munro, *German War Practices*, under "Hostages and Screens.")

"We waited for the advance of the Germans," states a British officer; "some civilians reported to us that they were coming down a road in front of us. On looking in that direction we saw, instead of German troops, a crowd of civilians—men, women, and children—waving white handkerchiefs and being pushed down the road in front of a large number of German troops."—"They came on as it were in a mass," states a British soldier, "with the women and children massed in front of them. They seemed to be pushing them on, and I saw them shoot down women and children who refused to march. Up to this my orders had been not to fire, but when we saw women and children shot my sergeant said: 'It is too heartrending,' and gave orders to fire, which we did."—"I saw the Germans advancing on hands and knees towards our positions," states another; "they were in close formation, and had a line of women and children in front of their front rank. Our orders at that time were not to fire on civilians in front of the enemy."—(J. Arnold Toynbee, *The German Terror in France*, pp. 6-7.)

- (c) Wounded and prisoners killed in many instances. (See Munro, *German War Practices*; *War Cyclopedia*, under "Hun," "Prisoners of War," "Quarter," etc.)

"28th August.—They [the French] lay in heaps of eight or ten wounded or dead on the top of one another. Those who could still walk we made prisoners and brought with us. Those who were seriously wounded, in the head or lungs, etc., and who could not stand upright, were given one more bullet, which put an end to their life. Indeed, that was the order which we had received."—(Diary of a German soldier, in Joseph Bédier, *How Germany seeks to Justify her Atrocities*, p. 45.)

"By leaps and bounds we got across the clearing. They were here, there, and everywhere hidden in the thicket. Now it is down with the enemy! And we will give them no quarter . . . We knock down or bayonet the wounded, for we know that those scoundrels fire at our backs when we have gone by. There was a Frenchman there stretched out, full length, face down, pretending to be dead. A kick from a strong fusilier soon taught him that we were there. Turning round he asked for quarter, but we answered: 'Is that the way your tools work, you—,' and he was nailed to the ground. Close to me I heard odd cracking sounds. They were blows from a gun on the bald head of a Frenchman which a private of the 154th was dealing out vigorously; he was wisely using a French gun so as not to break his own. Tender-hearted souls are so kind to the French wounded that they finish them with a bullet, but others give them as many thrusts and blows as they can."—(Article entitled "A Day of Honor for our Regiment—24th September, 1914," in the *Jauresches Tageblatt*, 18th October, 1914; facsimile in Joseph Bédier, *German Atrocities from German Evidence*, pp. 32-33.)

"After today no more prisoners will be taken. All prisoners are to be killed. Wounded, with or without arms, are to be killed. Even prisoners already grouped in convoys are to be killed. Let not a single living enemy remain behind us."—(Order given 26th August, 1914, by General Stenger, of the 58th German Brigade; testified to by numerous German prisoners. See Bédier, *German Atrocities*, pp. 28-29, 39-40.)

"When you meet the foe you will defeat him. No quarter will be given, no prisoners will be taken. Let all who fall into your hands be at your mercy. Just as the Huns a thousand years ago, under the leadership of Etzel [Attila], gained a reputation in virtue of which they still live in historical tradition, so may the name of Germany become known in such a manner in China that no Chinaman will ever again dare to look askance at a German."—(Speech of the Kaiser to German troops embarking for the Boxer War in 1900; reported in *Bremen Weser Zeitung* and in other German newspapers; quoted in *London Times*, July 30, 1900.)

"It is forbidden . . . to kill or wound an enemy who, having laid down his arms and having no means of self-defense, gives himself up as a prisoner; to declare that no quarter will be given."—(Hague Convention of 1907, Article 23.)

- (d) Inhuman treatment of British captives in German prison camps, at Wittenberg and elsewhere. (See Munro, *German War Practices*; *War Cyclopedia*, under "Prisoners of War," etc.) Compare Libby and Andersonville prisons during our Civil War.—The British treatment of German prisoners, on the other hand, was humane and correct.

5. Submarine warfare waged in disregard of international law. Sinking without warning of the *Falaba*, *Cushing*, *Gulflight*, *Lusitania*, *Arabic*, *Sussex*, etc; ruthless destruction of lives of innocent men, women, and children. Great extension of submarine warfare after February 1, 1917. Policy of "sinking without leaving a trace" (*spürlos versenkt*). Instructions to sink even hospital ships. Utter disregard of the rights of neutrals. (See *War Cyclopedia*, under "*Lusitania Notes*," "Submarine Warfare," "*Spürlos Versenkt*," "Visit and Search," etc., and under names of vessels.)

"The new policy has swept every restriction aside. Vessels of every kind, whatever their flag, their character, their cargo, their destination, their errand, have been ruthlessly sent to the bottom without warning and without thought of help or mercy for those on board, the vessels of friendly neutrals along with those of belligerents."—(President Wilson, speech of April 2, 1917.)

6. Practical extermination of the Armenian nation by the Turks, evidently with German sanction (1915-16). (See *War Cyclopedia*, under "Armenian Massacres.")

"In order, I was told, to cover the extermination of the Armenian nation with a political cloak, military reasons were being put forward, which were said to make it necessary to drive the Armenians out of their native seats, which had been theirs for 2,500 years, and to deport them to the Arabian deserts. I was also told that individual Armenians had lent themselves to acts of espionage.

"After I had informed myself about the facts and had made inquiries on all sides, I came to the conclu-

sion that all these accusations against the Armenians were, in fact, based on trifling provocations, which were taken as an excuse for slaughtering 10,000 innocents for one guilty person, for the most savage outrages against women and children, and for a campaign of starvation against the exiles which was intended to exterminate the whole nation . . .

"Out of convoys which, when they left their homes on the Armenian plateau, numbered from two to three thousand men, women, and children, only two or three hundred survivors arrive here in the south. The men are slaughtered on the way; the women and girls, with the exception of the old, the ugly, and those who are still children, have been abused by Turkish soldiers and officers and then carried away to Turkish and Kurdish villages, where they have to accept Islam. They try to destroy the remnant of the convoys by hunger and thirst. Even when they are fording rivers, they do not allow those dying of thirst to drink. All the nourishment they receive is a daily ration of a little meal sprinkled over their hands, which they lick off greedily, and its only effect is to protract their starvation."—(Dr. Martin Niepage, *The Horrors of Aleppo, Seen by a German Eyewitness*, pp. 3-6.)

V. SUMMARY AND EXPLANATION OF GERMAN POLICY. (See *War Cyclopedia*, under "Der Tag," "German Military Autocracy," "Hegemony, German Ambition," "War, Responsibility for.")

"The German Government wages the war by methods which, judged even by standards till now conventional, are monstrous. Note, for example, the sudden attack upon Belgium and Luxemburg; poison gas, since adopted by all the belligerents; but most outrageous of all, the Zeppelin bombings, inspired with the purpose of annihilating every living person, combatant or non-combatant, over large areas; the submarine war on commerce; the torpedoing of the *Lusitania*, etc.; the system of taking hostages and levying contributions, especially at the outset in Belgium; the systematic exactions from Ukrainian, Georgian, Courland, Polish, Irish, Mohammedan, and other prisoners of war in the German prison camps, of treasonable war-service, and of treasonable espionage of the Central Powers; in the contract between Under-Secretary of State Zimmermann and Sir Roger Casement in December, 1914, for the organization, equipment, and training of the 'Irish brigade' made up of imprisoned British soldiers in the German prison camps; the attempts under threats by forced internment to compel enemy alien civilians found in Germany to perform treasonable war service against their own country, etc. 'Necessity knows no law.'" (Dr. Karl Liebknecht, the German Socialist leader, in leaflet dated May 3, 1916. See *War Cyclopedia*, under "Liebknecht on German War Policy.")

"This war was begun and these crimes against humanity were done because Germany was pursuing the hereditary policy of the Hohenzollerns and following the instincts of the arrogant military caste which rules Prussia, to grasp the overlordship of the civilized world and establish an empire in which she should play the role of ancient Rome. They were done because the Prussian militarist still pursues the policy of power through conquest, of aggrandizement through force and

fear, which in little more than two centuries has brought the puny Mark of Brandenburg with its million and a half of people to the control of a vast empire—the greatest armed force of the modern world."—(Senator Elihu Root, speech in Chicago, Sept. 14, 1917).

For reading references on Chapter VII, see page 37.

VIII. THE UNITED STATES ENTERS THE WAR.

I. STRUGGLE TO MAINTAIN OUR NEUTRALITY (1914-16).

1. American opinion at the outbreak of the war confused as to merits and issues in the controversy; conflicting sympathies of hyphenated groups. (See *War Cyclopedia* under "Hyphenated Americans," "United States, Isolation," "United States, Neutrality, 1914-17.")
2. Declaration of Neutrality of the United States, issued August 4, 1914. President Wilson's appeal for neutrality of sentiment. (August 18, 1914.) "Every man who really loves America will act and speak in the true spirit of neutrality, which is the spirit of impartiality and fairness and friendliness to all concerned. . . . It will be easy to excite passion and difficult to allay it." He expressed the fear that our Nation might become divided into camps of hostile opinion. "Such divisions among us . . . might seriously stand in the way of the proper performance of our duty as the one great nation at peace, the one people holding itself ready to play a part of impartial mediation and speak counsels of peace and accommodation, not as a partisan, but as a friend." (See *War Cyclopedia*, under "United States, Neutrality, 1914-17.")
3. Alienation of American sentiment from Germany and Austria. Invasion of Belgium generally condemned; admiration for her plucky resistance and horror at German atrocities; Cardinal Mercier's pastoral letter of Christmas, 1914; Commission for Belgian Relief under American direction (Mr. Herbert C. Hoover); Germany's monstrous crime in sinking the *Lusitania*; execution of Edith Cavell and Captain Fryatt. (See *War Cyclopedia*, under "Atrocities," "Belgium's Woe," "Cavell, Edith," "Fryatt, Captain," "Lusitania," "Mercier, Cardinal," etc.)
4. Was the neutrality of our Government a real neutrality? Lack of interest in the contest or of desire on the part of the people for the triumph of one or the other of the participants not necessary to neutrality of the Government. (See *War Cyclopedia*, under "Neutrality," "Neutral Rights," etc.)
5. Controversies with Great Britain over questions of blockade, contraband, and interference with our mails. Question of the applicability to the present emergency of the Declaration of London (drawn up in 1909 on the initiation of Great Britain, but not ratified before the war by any government.) Property rights alone involved in these controversies, which could be settled after the war by our existing arbitration treaty with Great Britain. (See *War Cyclopedia*, under "Blacklist," "Blockade," "Declaration of London," "Embargo, British," "Mails, British Interference with," "War Zone, British," etc.)
6. Controversies with Germany. Over our supplying munitions to the Allies, and her submarine sinkings (*Falaba*, *Cushing*, *Gulflight*, *Lusitania*, *Arabic*, etc.). Intrigues and conspiracies in the United States; the

Austro-Hungarian Ambassador, and the German attachés Boy-Ed and von Papen, dismissed by our Government (November 4, 1915) on clear proof of guilt, but no apologies to us or reprimand to them issued by their Governments. German intrigues against us in Cuba, Haiti, San Domingo, Mexico, etc.—For a defense of our policy in permitting sale of munitions, etc., see letter of Secretary of State W. J. Bryan to Senator Stone, January 20, 1915 (in *International Conciliation*, No. 96). (See *War Cyclopaedia*, under "Der Tag—When?," "Dumba," "German Intrigue," "Igel, von, Papers of," "German Government, Moral Bankruptcy of," "Manila Bay, Dewey and Diedrichs at," "Monroe Doctrine, German Attitude," "Intrigue," "Munitions," "Papen," "Sabotage," "Spies," "Strict Accountability," "Submarine Blockade," "Submarine Warfare," "Parole," "War Zone, German," and under names of vessels, etc.)

7. Apparent settlement of the submarine controversy in May, 1916.—Sinking of the channel passenger ship *Sussex* without warning on March 24, 1916, after months of expostulation, precipitates a crisis. Our demand that thenceforth Germany conduct her submarine warfare in accordance with international law, by (a) warning vessels before sinking them, and (b) placing passengers and crew in safety. Germany's conditional agreement to comply with this demand ends the crisis. (See *War Cyclopaedia*, under "Submarine Warfare, American Lives Lost," "Submarine Warfare, German Defense," "Submarine Warfare, Illegalities," "Submarine Warfare, Stages of," "Sussex," "Sussex Ultimatum," "Sussex Ultimatum, German Pledge," etc.)
8. Unceasing German intrigues against the United States. A semi-official list of intrigue charges against the German Government, based on one set only of German documents seized by our Government (the von Igel papers), includes the following: "Violation of the laws of the United States; destruction of lives and property in merchant vessels on the high seas; Irish revolutionary plots against Great Britain; fomenting ill feeling against the United States in Mexico; subornation of American writers and lecturers; financing of propaganda; maintenance of a spy system under the guise of a commercial investigation bureau; subsidizing of a bureau for the purpose of stirring up labor troubles in munition plants; the bomb industry and other related activities." Since our entrance into the war a vast amount of evidence as to Germany's treacherous and hostile intrigues on our soil has come into the possession of our Government. (See *War Cyclopaedia*, under "German Intrigue," "Igel, von, Papers of," "Parole," "Passports, German Frauds," etc.)

"From the very outset of the present war it has filled our unsuspecting communities and even our offices of government with spies and set criminal intrigues everywhere afoot against our national unity of counsel, our peace within and without, our industries and our commerce. Indeed it is now evident that its spies were here even before the war began; and it is unhappily not a matter of conjecture but a fact proved in our courts of justice that the intrigues which have more than once come perilously near to disturbing the peace and dislocating the industries of the country have been carried on at the instigation, with the support, and even under

the personal direction of official agents of the Imperial German Government accredited to the Government of the United States."—(President Wilson, Speech of April 2, 1917).

9. Reasons for our long enduring patience in dealing with Germany: (a) Hope that saner counsels might prevail in that country. (b) Our traditional sense of responsibility toward all the republics of the New World. (c) The desire, by keeping free from the conflict, more effectively to aid in restoring peace at its close. (See *War Cyclopaedia*, under "Pan-Americanism," "Permanent Peace," "Watchful Waiting," etc.)

II. FROM NEUTRALITY TO WAR (1916-17).

1. Unsuccessful Peace overtures (Dec. 1916-Jan. 1917). Independent overtures by Germany (Dec. 12, 1916), and by President Wilson (Dec. 18). Answer of the Allies based on the reasonable idea of "Reparation, Restoration and Security." Refusal of Germany to disclose her terms. (See *War Cyclopaedia*, under "Peace Overtures, German, 1916," "Peace Terms, German Industrialists on," "Peace Terms, German Professors on," etc.)

"Boasting of German conquests, 'the glorious deeds of our armies,' the [German] note implanted in neutral minds the belief that it was the purpose of the Imperial German Government to insist upon such conditions as would leave all Central Europe under German dominance and so build up an empire which would menace the whole liberal world. Moreover, the German proposal was accompanied by a thinly veiled threat to all neutral nations; and from a thousand sources, official and unofficial, the word came to Washington that unless the neutrals used their influence to bring the war to an end on terms dictated from Berlin, Germany and her allies would consider themselves henceforth free from any obligations to respect the rights of neutrals. The Kaiser ordered the neutrals to exert pressure on the Entente to bring the war to an abrupt end, or to beware of the consequences. Clear warnings were brought to our Government that if the German peace move should not be successful the submarines would be unleashed for a more intense and ruthless war upon all commerce." (*How the War Came to America*, pp. 10-11. See *War Cyclopaedia*, under "German Military Dominance," "Mittel Europa," etc.)

2. President Wilson outlined such a peace as the United States could join in guaranteeing (Jan. 22, 1917). Favorable reception of these proposals in the Entente countries; lack of response in Germany. (See *War Cyclopaedia*, under "Aim of the United States," "America, Creed," "Balance of Power," "League to Enforce Peace," "Permanent Peace, American Plan.")

"No peace can last, or ought to last, which does not [1] recognize and accept the principle that governments derive all their just powers from the consent of the governed, and that no right anywhere exists to hand people about from sovereignty to sovereignty as if they were property

"I am proposing, as it were, that the nations should with one accord adopt the doctrine of President Monroe as the doctrine of the world: that no nation should seek to extend its policy over any other nation or people

but that every people should be left free to determine its own policy, its own way of development, unhindered, unthreatened, unafraid, the little along with the great and powerful.

"I am proposing [2] that all nations henceforth avoid entangling alliances which would draw them into competitions of power, catch them in a net of intrigue and selfish rivalry, and disturb their own affairs with influences intruded from without. There is no entangling alliance in a concert of power. When all unite to act in the same sense and with the same purpose, all act in the common interest and are free to live their own lives under a common protection.

"I am proposing . . . [3] that freedom of the seas which in international conference after conference representatives of the United States have urged with the eloquence of those who are the convinced disciples of liberty; and [4] that moderation of armaments which make of armies and navies a power for order merely, not an instrument of aggression or of selfish violence."

[5] "Mere agreements may not make peace secure. It will be absolutely necessary that a force be created as a guarantor of the permanency of the settlement so much greater than the force of any nation now engaged or any alliance hitherto formed or projected that no nation, no probable combination of nations, could face or withstand it. If the peace presently to be made is to endure, it must be a peace made secure by the organized major force of mankind." (President Wilson, Speech to U. S. Senate, Jan. 22, 1917.)

3. The "Zimmermann note" falls into the hands of the United States Government (dated Jan. 16, 1917; published through the Associated Press, February 28). In this the German Secretary for Foreign Affairs secretly informs the German minister to Mexico of the German intention to repudiate the Sussex pledge, and instructs him to offer the Mexican Government New Mexico and Arizona if Mexico will join with Japan in attacking the United States. (See *War Cyclopedia*, under "Zimmermann Note.")

4. The German Government officially notifies the United States (Jan. 31, 1917) that "from February 1, 1917, sea traffic will be stopped with every available weapon and without further notice." This meant the renewal of ruthless submarine operations, in violation of the pledge given after the sinking of the *Sussex*. (See *War Cyclopedia*, as above under I-7, also under "Submarine Warfare, Unrestricted.")

"The German Chancellor . . . stated before the Imperial Diet that the reason this ruthless policy had not been earlier employed was simply because the Imperial Government had not then been ready to act. In brief, under the guise of friendship and the cloak of false promises, it had been preparing this attack."—(*How the War Came to America*, p. 13.)

5. German Ambassador to the United States dismissed and diplomatic relations severed (Feb. 3, 1917). This act was not equivalent to a declaration of war. President Wilson in his speech to the Senate announcing it distinguished sharply between the German Government and the German people.—Failure of the German Government to recall its submarine order led the President to

recommend to Congress (Feb. 26) a policy of "armed neutrality." More than 500 out of 531 members of the two houses of Congress were ready and anxious to act; but a "filibuster" of a handful of "willful men" defeated the measure, by prolonging the debate until the expiration of the congressional session, on March 4.—March 12, orders were finally issued to arm American merchant ships against submarines. (See *War Cyclopedia*, under "Armed Neutrality Adopted," "Diplomatic Immunity," "Prussian Treaties, Attempted Modification of," "United States, Break with Germany," "United States, Neutrality, 1914-17," etc.)

6. President Wilson urges the recognition of a state of war with Germany (April 2). (See *War Cyclopedia*, under "United States, Break with Germany," etc.)

"The present German submarine warfare against commerce is a warfare against mankind. It is a warfare against all nations. American ships have been sunk, American lives taken, in ways which it has stirred us very deeply to learn of, but the ships and people of other neutral and friendly nations have been sunk and overwhelmed in the waters in the same way. There has been no discrimination. The challenge is to all mankind. Each nation must decide for itself how it will meet it . . . There is one choice we cannot make, we are incapable of making; we will not choose the path of submission and suffer the most sacred rights of our nation and our people to be ignored or violated. The wrongs against which we now array ourselves are no common wrongs; they cut to the very roots of human life.

"With a profound sense of the solemn and even tragical character of the step I am taking and of the grave responsibilities which it involves, but in unhesitating obedience to what I deem my constitutional duty, I advise that the Congress declare the recent course of the Imperial German Government to be in fact nothing less than war against the Government and people of the United States; that it formally accept the status of belligerent which has thus been thrust upon it; and that it take immediate steps not only to put the country in a more thorough state of defense but also to exert all its power and employ all its resources to bring the Government of the German Empire to terms and end the war . . . It will involve the utmost practicable co-operation in counsel and action with the Governments now at war with Germany.

"We have no quarrel with the German people. We have no feelings towards them but one of sympathy and friendship. It was not upon their impulse that their Government acted in entering this war. It was not with their previous knowledge or approval. It was a war determined upon as wars used to be determined upon in the old unhappy days when peoples were nowhere consulted by their rulers and wars were provoked and waged in the interest of dynasties or of little groups of ambitious men who were accustomed to use their fellow men as pawns and tools. Self-governed nations do not fill their neighbor States with spies or set the course of intrigue to bring about some critical posture of affairs which will give them an opportunity to strike and make conquest. Such designs can be successfully worked out only under cover and where no one has the right to ask questions. Cunningly contrived plans of deception or aggression, carried, it may

be, from generation to generation, can be worked out and kept from the light only within the privacy of courts or behind the carefully guarded confidences of a narrow and privileged class. They are happily impossible where public opinion commands and insists upon full information concerning all the nation's affairs.

"A steadfast concert for peace can never be maintained except by a partnership of democratic nations. No autocratic Government could be trusted to keep faith within it or to observe its covenants. It must be a league of honor, a partnership of opinion. Intrigue would eat its vitals away; the plottings of inner circles who could plan what they would and render account to no one would be a corruption seated at its very heart. Only free peoples can hold their purpose and their honor steady to a common end and prefer the interests of mankind to any narrow interest of their own . . .

"The world must be made safe for democracy. Its peace must be planted upon the tested foundations of political liberty. We have no selfish ends to serve. We desire no conquest, no dominion. We seek no indemnities for ourselves, no material compensation for the sacrifices we shall freely make. We are but one of the champions of the rights of mankind. We shall be satisfied when those rights have been made as secure as the faith and the freedom of nations can make them . . .

"We shall, happily, still have an opportunity to prove that friendship [for the German people] in our daily attitude and actions towards the millions of men and women of German birth and native sympathy who live amongst us and share our life, and we shall be proud to prove it towards all who are in fact loyal to their neighbors and to the Government in the hour of test. They are, most of them, as true and loyal Americans as if they had never known any other fealty or allegiance. They will be prompt to stand with us in rebuking and restraining the few who may be of a different mind and purpose. If there should be disloyalty, it will be dealt with with a firm hand of stern repression; but if it lifts its head at all, it will lift it only here and there and without countenance except from a lawless and malignant few."—(Speech to the Senate, April 2, 1917)

7. Declaration of a state of war with Germany. Passed in the Senate (April 4) by a vote of 32 to 6; in the House (April 6), 373 to 50. (See *War Cyclopedia*, under "War, Declaration Against Germany.")

"Whereas, The Imperial German Government has committed repeated acts of war against the Government and the people of the United States of America: Therefore be it *Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled*, That the state of war between the United States and the Imperial German Government which has thus been thrust upon the United States is hereby formally declared; and that the President be, and he is hereby, authorized and directed to employ the entire naval and military forces of the United States and the resources of the Government to carry on war against the Imperial German Government; and to bring the conflict to a successful termination all the resources of the country are hereby pledged by the Congress of the United

States."—(Joint Resolution of Congress, approved by the President, April 6, 1917)

8. Declaration of War against Austria-Hungary (Dec. 7, 1917). Passed unanimously in the Senate, and with one opposing vote (Meyer London, Socialist, from New York City) in the House. (See *War Cyclopedia*, under "Austria-Hungary, Break with," "Dumba, Recall of," "War, Declaration against Austria-Hungary," etc.)

III. SUMMARY OF OUR REASONS FOR ENTERING THE WAR.

1. Because of the renewal by Germany of her submarine warfare in a more violent form than ever before, contrary to the assurance given to our Government in the spring of 1916. This resulted in the loss of additional American lives and property on the high seas and produced in the minds of the President and Congress the conviction that national interest and national honor required us to take up the gauntlet which Germany had thrown down. (See *War Cyclopedia*, under "Submarine Warfare, American Lives Lost," etc.)
2. Because of the conviction, unwillingly reached, that the Imperial German Government had repudiated wholesale the commonly accepted principles of law and humanity, and was "running amuck" as an international desperado, who could be made to respect law and right only by forcible and violent means. The cumulative effect of Germany's outrages should be noted in this connection. (See *War Cyclopedia*, under "German Diplomacy," "German Government, Moral Bankruptcy of.")
3. Because of the conviction that Prussian militarism and autocracy, let loose in the world, disturbed the balance of power and threatened to destroy the international equilibrium. They were a menace to all nations save those allied with Germany; and the menace must be overthrown, as Napoleonism had been at the beginning of the nineteenth century, by a coalition of the states whose honor, rights, and national existence were endangered. The Middle Europe project should receive attention in this connection. (See *War Cyclopedia*, under "Autocracy," "Hegemony," "Kaiserism," "Mittel-Europa," "Prussianism," etc.)
4. Because of the gradual shaping of the conflict into a war between democratic nations on the one hand and autocratic nations on the other, and because of the conviction that, as our nation in Lincoln's day could not hope to long endure "half slave and half free," so the world community of today could not continue to exist part autocratic and part democratic. Note the effect of the Russian Revolution on the issues of the war. (See *War Cyclopedia*, under "Russian Revolution of 1917.")
5. Because of the conviction that our traditional policy of isolation and aloofness was outgrown and outworn, and could no longer be maintained in the face of the growing interdependence which is one of the leading characteristics of this modern age. (See *War Cyclopedia*, "United States, Isolation.")
6. Because of the menace to the Monroe Doctrine and to our own independence. (See *War Cyclopedia*, under "America Threatened," "Monroe Doctrine, German Attitude.")

"The history, the character, the avowed principles of action, the manifest and undisguised purpose of the German autocracy made it clear and certain that if America stayed out of the Great War, and Germany won, America would forthwith be required to defend herself, and would be unable to defend herself, against the same lust for conquest, the same will to dominate the world which has made Europe a bloody shambles. . .

"If we had stayed out of the war and Germany had won, we should have had to defend the Monroe Doctrine by force or abandon it; and if we had abandoned it, there would have been a German naval base in the Caribbean commanding the Panama Canal, depriving us of that strategic line which unites the eastern and western coasts, and depriving us of the protection the expanse of ocean once gave.

"And an America unable or unwilling to protect herself against the establishment of a German naval base in the Caribbean would lie at the mercy of Germany and subject to Germany's orders.

"America's independence would be gone unless she was ready to fight for it, and her security would thenceforth be not a security of freedom but only a security purchased by submission."—(Elihu Root, speech in Chicago, Sept. 14, 1917).

IV. DUTY OF ALL CITIZENS TO SUPPORT THE WAR WHOLE-HEARTEDLY.

"A nation which declares war and goes on discussing whether it ought to have declared war or not is impotent, paralyzed, imbecile, and earns the contempt of mankind and the certainty of humiliating defeat and subjection to foreign control.

"A democracy which cannot accept its own decisions made in accordance with its own laws, but must keep on endlessly discussing the questions already decided, has failed in the fundamental requirements of self-government; and, if the decision is to make war, the failure to exhibit capacity for self-government by action will inevitably result in the loss of the right of self-government.

"Before the decision of a proposal to make war, men may range themselves upon one side or the other of the question; but after the decision in favor of war the country has ranged itself, and the only issue left for the individual citizen is whether he is for or against his country.

"From that time on arguments against the war in which the country is engaged are enemy arguments.

"Their spirit is the spirit of rebellion against the Government and laws of the United States.

"Their effect is to hinder and lessen that popular support of the Government in carrying on the war which is necessary to success.

"Their manifest purpose is to prevent action by continuing discussion.

"They encourage the enemy. They tend to introduce delay and irresolution into our own councils.

"The men who are speaking and writing and printing arguments against the war now, and against everything which is being done to carry on the war, are rendering more effective service to Germany than they ever could render in the field with arms in their hands. The purpose and effect of what they are doing is so plain that it is impossible to resist the conclusion that the greater part

of them are at heart traitors to the United States and willfully seeking to bring about the triumph of Germany and the humiliation and defeat of their own country. i ■

"The same principles apply to the decision of numerous questions which arise in carrying on the war [such as conscription, sending troops to France, etc.] . . . ■

"It is beyond doubt that many of the professed pacifists, the opponents of the war after the war has been entered upon, the men who are trying to stir up resistance to the draft, the men who are inciting strikes in the particular branches of production which are necessary for the supply of arms and munitions of war, are intentionally seeking to aid Germany and defeat the United States. As time goes on and the character of these acts becomes more and more clearly manifest, all who continue to associate with them must come under the same condemnation as traitors to their country."—(Elihu Root, speech at Chicago, Sept. 14, 1917).

For reading references on Chapter VIII, see page 37

IX. COURSE OF THE WAR, 1914-17

I. CAMPAIGN OF 1914.

1. Germany's general plan of action: First crush France, then Russia, then Great Britain. The German plan in its earlier stages was like a timetable, with each step scheduled by day and hour.

2. On the Western Front:

(a) Belgium overrun (August 4-20). Resistance of Liège, Namur, etc., overcome by giant artillery (42-centimeter mortars); but the delay (of ten days) gave the French time to mobilize and threw the German plans out of gear. Liège occupied, August 7; Brussels, August 20; Namur, August 22; Louvain burned, August 28.

"Every minute in it [the German plan] was determined. From the German frontier, opposite Ais-la-Chapelle, to the gap of the Oise, on the French frontier . . . there are six days' march. But the passage of the Germans across Belgium in arms halted before Liège and before Namur, halted on the edge of the Gette, beaten on August 12 on the edge of the forest of Haelen, victorious on August 18 and 19 at Aerschot—had lasted *sixteen days* (August 4-20). The splendid effort of the Belgians had therefore made ten full days late the arrival of the German armies on the French frontier, from which only eight marches separated them from the advanced forts of Paris."—(Joseph Reinach, in *N. Y. Times Current History*, Sept., 1917, p. 495)

(b) Invasion of France. Advance of Germans in five armies through Belgium and Luxemburg: General von Moltke, chief of staff; Generals von Kluck, von Buelow, etc. Wary tactics of the French under General Joffre; arrival of the British expeditionary force (150,000 men) under General French (August 8-21); Battle of Mons-Charleroi (August 21-23); dogged withdrawal of the French and British from Belgium to the line of the River Marne, while a new French army (the Sixth) was being formed. —Advance of the Germans to within twenty-three miles of Paris; then sudden swerve to the east away from Paris.

- (c) Battle of the Marne (September 6-10). The opposing forces in contact from Paris to Verdun, a front of one hundred and eighty miles. French attempt to turn the German west flank. German armies forced to retreat from the Marne to the River Aisne, where they entrenched.

The battle of the Marne was "one more decisive battle of the world, . . . for Europe conceivably the greatest in permanent meaning since Waterloo. In that battle it has been decided that Europe should still be European and not Prussian. At the Marne, France had saved herself and Europe."—(F. H. Simons, in *American Review of Reviews*, for February, 1915, page 179.)

- (d) Failure of the Allies (Sept. 12-17) to break through the German line in the Battle of the Aisne. Extension of the trench system from Switzerland to the North Sea (fall of Antwerp, Oct. 8). Importance of German conquest of Belgian coast as supplying bases for her later submarine warfare.

The battle line established after the Battle of the Aisne remained practically stationary, with some slight swaying backward and forward, for the next three years. The parts of France held by the Germans included ninety per cent of her iron ore, eighty per cent of her iron and steel manufactures, and fifty per cent of her coal resources.

- (e) Battle of the River Yser (Oct. 21-31); Belgians cut their dykes. First battle of Ypres (Nov. 1-15); Prussian Guards defeated by the "contemptible little army" of Great Britain. German losses on Yser and at Ypres, 150,000.

2. On the Eastern Front:

- (a) First Russian invasion of East Prussia (Aug. 18) following their unexpectedly rapid mobilization. The resulting necessity of withdrawing German troops from the West front helped to produce the German check on the Marne. Russians disastrously defeated among the Mazurian lakes in the Battle of Tannenberg (Aug. 26-Sept. 1). General Hindenburg thenceforth the idol of Germany.

- (b) Russian invasion of Galicia. Breakdown of the Austrian resistance. Capture of Tarnopol, Halicz and Lemberg (Aug. 27-Sept. 3); Jaroslav (Nov. 5); siege of Przemyśl (surrendered March 22, 1915); invasion of Hungary threatened.

- (c) German invasion of Russian Poland fails. Three offensives of German armies against Warsaw beaten off (Nov.—Dec.). Narrow escape of a German army from disaster in the Battle of Lodz (Nov. 19-Dec. 3).

- (d) Thanks to the relaxation of Austrian pressure, due to the foregoing events, Serbia expelled the Austrian invaders from her territory (Dec. 14).

3. Loss of Germany's colonies. New Guinea, Bismarck archipelago, etc., taken by the Australians (Sept.). Tsingtau (Nov. 7) and various Pacific islands captured by the Japanese. British conquest of Togoland (August 26); German Southwest Africa (July 15, 1915); Kamerun (Feb. 16, 1916); British invasion of German East Africa begun (conquest completed in December, 1917).—Failure of De Wet's German-aided rebellion in

South Africa owing to loyalty of the Boers (Oct.—Dec., 1914).—Pro-Turkish Khedive of Egypt deposed, British protectorate proclaimed, and a new ruler set up with title of Sultan (Dec. 17, 1914).

4. Turkey openly joins the Teutonic Allies (Oct. 29). Defeat of Turks by Russians in the Caucasian region (Jan. 1915). Failure of Turkish attempts to invade Egypt (Feb. 3, 1915). Revolt of the "holy places" in Arabia against Turkish rule and establishment of a petty kingdom there (June 27, 1916).

5. Naval War. Great importance in the war of British naval preponderance, aided by early concentration in the North Sea. British naval victory in Helgoland Bight (Aug. 28). German naval victory in the Pacific off coast of Chili (Nov. 1). Three British cruisers torpedoed by submarines in the North Sea (Sept. 21). German cruiser *Emden* caught and destroyed at Cocos Island after sensational career (Nov. 10). British naval victory off Falkland islands (Dec. 8) avenges defeat of Nov. 1. German fleets driven from the seas. Disappearance of German shipping. Freedom of action for British transport of East Indian, New Zealand, Australian, and Canadian troops, etc., to Europe, and of Allied commerce, except for the (as yet slight) submarine danger. Error of Great Britain in failing to declare at once a rigid blockade of Germany.

6. Situation at close of 1914: On western front, defeat of the plan of the German General Staff; on eastern front, Teutonic forces held in check; Germany and Austria as yet cut off from their new ally, Turkey. On the whole the advantage was on the side of the Entente Allies. But the Allied commanders (General Joffre, Lord Kitchener, and Grand Duke Nicholas) failed fully to grasp the needs of the situation. "Each of these leaders believed that the height of military efficiency had been reached in the past campaigns"; in the great development of barrier fire and the excellence of the French "75's." The Teutonic allies, on the other hand, "were making the colossal preparations of artillery and munitions which were destined to change the year 1915 into a tragedy for the Entente Allies."—(T. C. Frothingham, in *N. Y. Times Current History*, Sept., 1917, page 422.)

II. CAMPAIGN OF 1915.

1. On the West Front. Failure of the Allied offensive in Champagne (March—April); Battle of Neuve Chapelle. Second Battle of Ypres (April 22-28); Germans first use poison gas; heroism of the Canadians. Inadequacy of Allies' preparations for carrying the formidable German entrenchments. Desultory fighting through the summer. Failure of the second offensive in Champagne and Flanders (Sept.). General French superseded by General Haig as British commander in chief. Death of Lord Kitchener through the sinking of the warship *Hampshire* (June 7, 1916).

2. The Gallipoli Expedition. Failure of Allies to force the Dardanelles with their fleets alone (Feb.—March). Troops landed after long delay, in April and August. Abandonment of expedition in Dec.—Jan., after enormous losses. Disastrous effects on the hesitating na-

- tions, Bulgaria and Greece. Bitter controversy in Great Britain over the question of responsibility for this fiasco.
3. Second Russian invasion of East Prussia crushed by Hindenburg in Battle of Masurian Lakes (Feb. 12). Russians lost 150,000 killed and wounded and 100,000 prisoners.
 4. Terrific drive of combined Germans and Austrians under Hindenburg and Mackensen in Poland and Galicia (April—Aug.). Fall of Przemyśl (June 2); Lemberg (June 22); Warsaw (Aug. 5). All Poland conquered; Courland overrun. Russian losses, 1,200,000 killed and wounded; 900,000 captured; 65,000 square miles of territory. Russian line established from Riga to Eastern Galicia. Grand Duke Nicholas removed from chief command and sent to command in the Caucasus (Sept. 8).
 5. Bulgaria joins the Teutonic Allies (Oct. 13). Serbia crushed by simultaneous invasions of Austro-Germans and Bulgarians (completed Dec. 2). Montenegro conquered (Jan. 1916)—Landing of an Anglo-French army at Saloniki prevents King Constantine of Greece from openly joining the Teutonic alliance.
 6. Italy declares war on Austria (May 23) to recover the regions about Trent (the "Trentino") and Trieste. Lack of military results on Italian front in 1915 (failure to capture Gorizia). War on Germany not declared until Aug. 27, 1916.
 7. Naval War. In a battle in the North Sea (Jan. 24) a British patrolling squadron defeated a German raiding squadron. Increasing use of submarines by Germany. German proclamation of "a war zone" about the British Isles (in force Feb. 18) establishes a so-called "blockade" of Great Britain.—Sinking of the passenger steamship *Lusitania* (May 7) with loss of 1198 lives (114 Americans).
 8. Increase in Allies' munitions supply arranged for; appointment (May, 1915) of Lloyd George to be British Minister of Munitions. Failure of Zeppelin raids over England to produce expected results. (Between Jan. 19, 1915, and Oct. 1, 1917, German aircraft, including Zeppelins, raided England thirty four times, killing outright 865 men, women, and children, and wounding over 2,500.)
 9. Summary: The situation at the end of 1915 was much less favorable for the Entente than at the beginning of the year. Little change on Western front. Great changes on Eastern front—Russians driven from Russian Poland and Austrian Galicia; Hungary saved from invasion; Central Powers linked to Turkey by the adhesion of Bulgaria and the conquest of Serbia. "The Teutons were no longer hemmed in; they had raised the siege."
- ### III. CAMPAIGN OF 1916.
1. Battle of Verdun ("no longer a fortress but a series of trenches"). Great German attack under the Crown Prince (Feb.—June); defeated by the heroic resistance of the French under General Pétain ("They shall not pass.") Enormous German losses (about 500,000 men) through attacks in close formation against French fortifications defended by "barrage" fire and machine guns. Practically all ground lost was slowly regained by the French in the autumn. "Verdun was the grave of Germany's claim to military invincibility."—(Col. A. M. Murray, *Fortnightly History of the War*, I. 368).—Hindenburg made commander-in-chief of the German forces, August 29.
 2. Battle of the Somme (July 1—Nov.). The strengthened artillery of the Allies enabled them to drive back the German front on a breadth of twenty miles, and nine miles deep. Estimated loss of Germans 700,000 men; German estimate of French and British loss, 800,000. The Allies failed to break through the German lines.
 3. Galician and Armenian Fronts. Great Russian offensive (June—Sept.) under General Brusilov, on front from Pripet marshes to Bukovinian border. Capture of Czernovitz (June 18). Hundreds of thousands of Austrians taken prisoners.—Successful offensive of Grand Duke Nicholas in Armenia against the Turks; capture of Erzerum (Feb. 16) and Trebizond (April 18).
 4. Roumania enters the war and is crushed. Encouraged by Allied successes and coerced by the disloyal Russian Court; Roumania declared war (Aug. 27) with a view to rescuing her kindred populations from Austrian rule. Unsupported invasion of Transylvania; terrific counter attacks by German-Austrian-Bulgarian armies under Generals Mackensen and Falkenhayn; Roumanians driven from Transylvania. Greater part of Roumania conquered (fall of Bucharest, Dec. 6). Rich wheat-fields and oil lands gained by Teutons, and the "corridor" to Constantinople widened. The "Mittel-Europa" project approaches realization.
 5. British failure in Mesopotamia. Basra, on Persian Gulf, taken by British Nov. 31, 1914; advance of General Townshend's inadequate expedition from India up the Tigris River toward Bagdad; expedition besieged by Turks at Kut-el-Amara (Jan.—April, 1916); relieving expedition forced to turn back. Surrender of General Townshend (April 29) with 13,000 men. Serious blow to British prestige in the East. (The report of an investigating commission, June 26, 1917, divides the responsibility for failure between the Home Government and the Government in India.)
 6. Italian Front. Successful Austrian offensive from the Trentino (May 16—June 3). Brusilov's drive in Galicia, however, relieved the pressure upon the Italians, who then (Aug. 6th to Sept.) freed Italian soil of the Austrians, and began an offensive which brought them Gorizia on the River Isonzo (Aug. 9) and carried them to within thirteen miles of Trieste.
 7. Naval War. Battle of Jutland (May 31); the German high seas fleet engaged the British battle-cruiser fleet until darkness enabled the German ships to escape the on-coming British dreadnaughts.—Increased use of submarines by Germans. Channel packet *Sussex* sunk (March 25) without warning, in violation of German pledge.
 8. Political events in Great Britain affecting the war. Adoption of compulsory military service (May 25) lays the basis for a British army of 5,000,000 men.—Sinn Féin rebellion in Ireland crushed (April 25—28); Sir

Roger Casement executed (Aug. 2).—Lloyd George displaces Asquith as head of British cabinet, to infuse new energy into the war (Dec. 5-7).

9. Summary: The balance in 1916 inclined on the whole in favor of the Allies—at Verdun, on the Somme, in Galicia, in Italy, and on the sea. Against these victories must be set the disasters of Roumania and Mesopotamia. The Central Powers continued to possess the advantage of operating on interior lines, enabling them while adopting a defensive attitude on certain fronts to concentrate for a drive elsewhere; also of their superiority (though diminished) in strategy, tactics, and material equipment.

IV. CAMPAIGN OF 1917.

1. Unrestricted submarine warfare begun by Germany (Feb. 1). Hundreds of thousands of tons of belligerent and neutral shipping sunk each month; (merchant shipping destroyed by mines and submarines to Jan. 1, 1917, was 3,982,556 tons; from January to June, 1917 the total was 3,600,000 tons). Reliance upon this weapon by Germany to starve Great Britain out; failure of the policy to achieve the ends planned. (See *War Cyclopedia*, under "Shipping, Losses," "Spurlos Versenkt Applied," "Submarine Blockade," "Submarine Warfare," etc.)
2. Entrance of the United States into the War. War declared on Germany, April 6; on Austria-Hungary, December 7. (See chapter viii.) Energetic measures to raise and train an army of several million men, and to provide food, munitions, and shipping for ourselves and our associates. Magnitude of this task prevented the full weight of the United States being felt in 1917. Nevertheless, about 250,000 American troops were in France under General Pershing by December. (See *War Cyclopedia*, under "Austria-Hungary, Break With," "United States, Break with Germany," "War, Declaration Against Austria-Hungary," "War, Declaration Against Germany"; also under "Acts of Congress," "Alien Enemies," "Army," "Bonds Act," "Cantonments," "Espionage Act," "Food and Fuel Control Act," "Profiteering," "Red Cross," "Selective Service," "Shipping Board," "War Industries Board," "Y. M. C. A.," etc.)
3. Further Spread of the War. Cuba and Panama follow the United States in declaring war on Germany (April 7). King Constantine of Greece deposed (June 11, 1917) and Greece joined the Allies (July 2). Siam declared war on Germany July 22; Liberia, August 4; China, Aug. 14. Brazil repealed its declaration of neutrality and severed diplomatic relations; war declared Oct. 26. The following broke diplomatic relations with Germany: Bolivia (April 14), Guatemala (April 27), Honduras (May 17), Nicaragua (May 18) Haiti (June 17), Costa Rica (Sept. 21), Peru (Oct. 6), Uruguay (Oct. 7), Ecuador (Dec. 8). German destruction of South American vessels and revelations of the abuse by her diplomats of Argentine neutrality under cover of Swedish diplomatic immunity (the Luxburg dispatches; *spurlos versenkt*), led to widespread agitations for war with Germany and united action of all the South American countries.
4. Western Front. Withdrawal of German forces on a front of fifty miles to new and more defensible positions (the "Hindenburg line") extending from Arras to Soissons (March); wanton wasting of the country evacuated. *Battle of Arras* (April 9—May) brought slight gains to the Allies; a mine of 1,000,000 lbs. of high explosives was fired at Messines (July 7).—Terrific British offensives in *Battle of Flanders* (July—Dec.) won Passchendaele ridge and other gains. *Battle of Cambrai* (Nov. 20—Dec.) begun by "tanks" without artillery preparation, penetrated Hindenburg line and forced German retirement on front of twenty miles, to depth of several miles. Terrific German counter attacks forced partial retirement of British (from Bourlon wood, etc.)
5. Italian Front. Great Italian offensive begun in the Isonzo area (Carso Plateau) in May. When the Russian Revolution permitted the withdrawal of Austrian troops to the Italian front, a new Austro-German counter-drive was begun (Oct.—Dec.) which undid the work of two years. Northeastern Italy invaded; Italian stand on the Piave and Brenta Rivers (Asiago Plateau). French and British aid checked further enemy advance in 1917. Interallied War Council formed (Nov.)
6. Bagdad captured by a new British expedition (March 11). Restoration of British prestige in the East. Co-operation of Russian and British forces in Asia Minor and Persia. British advances from Egypt into Palestine in March; Ascalon and Jaffa taken (Nov.); Jerusalem surrendered to British, Dec. 9, 1917.
7. Revolution in Russia. Due to pro-German policy of certain members of the Russian court and the well founded suspicion that a separate peace with Germany was planned. Abdication of the Tsar, March 19. Power seized from Constitutional Democrats by moderate socialists and radicals (Council of Workmen's and Soldiers' Delegates); formation of a government under Alexander Kerensky (July 22). Military power of Russia paralyzed by abolition of discipline; frequent refusals of soldiers to obey orders; "fraternizing" of the armies encouraged by German agents. Germans seized Riga (Sept. 3), and the islands at entrance to Gulf of Riga (Oct. 13-15), thus threatening Petrograd. General Kornilov failed in an attempt to seize power with a view to restoring order and prosecuting the war (Sept.).—Overthrow of Kerensky (Nov.) by extreme socialists (Bolsheviks), who repudiated Russia's obligations to the Allies, and negotiated a separate armistice with Germany with a view to an immediate peace, Dec. 15). Practical withdrawal of Russia from the war, permitting transfer of German troops to the French and Italian fronts. (See *War Cyclopedia*, under "Kerensky," "Lenine," "Russian Revolution," etc.)
8. Summary: Ruthless submarining imparts a more desperate character to the conflict, but brings Germany and her allies no nearer ultimate victory. Against her submarine successes, the Austro-German gains in Italy, and the Russian defection, must be set the British victories in Mesopotamia and Palestine, the Allied gains on the Western Front, and the entrance of the United States with its vast potential resources into the war.

For reading references on Chapter IX, see page 37.

X. PROPOSALS FOR PEACE: WILL THIS BE THE LAST WAR?

I. SUMMARY OF STATES AT WAR IN 1917.

1. The Teutonic Allies: Austria-Hungary, Germany, Turkey (1914); Bulgaria (1915).
2. The Entente Allies: Serbia, Russia, France, Belgium, Great Britain, Montenegro, Japan (1914); Italy, San Marino (1915); Portugal, Roumania (1916); United States, Cuba, Panama, Liberia, Siam, China, Brasil (1917). Bolivia, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, Haiti, Costa Rica, Peru, Uruguay and Ecuador severed diplomatic relations with Germany (1917) without declaring war.

II. AMERICAN AIMS IN THE WAR. (See *War Cyclopedia*, under "Aims of the United States," "Permanent Peace, American Plans," "United States, Isolation of," "War Aims of the United States.")

1. Vindication of our national rights. "We enter the war only where we are clearly forced into it, because there is no other means of defending our rights." Hence war not declared at first against Austria-Hungary, Turkey, and Bulgaria.
2. Vindication of the rights of humanity. "Our motive [will not be revenge or the victorious assertion of the physical might of the nation, but only the vindication of right, of human right . . . Our object . . . is to vindicate the principles of peace and justice in the life of the world as against selfish and autocratic power."
3. Making the world safe for Liberty and Democracy. "We are glad . . . to fight thus for the ultimate peace of the world and the rights of nations great and small and the privilege of men everywhere to choose their way of life and obedience. The world must be made safe for democracy. Its peace must be planted upon the tested foundations of political liberty." (The above quotations are from President Wilson's speech to Congress on April 2, 1917.)
4. Creation of an improved international system including a permanent League or Concert of Powers to preserve international peace. (See President Wilson's speech of January 22, 1917, as well as his speech of April 2.)
5. Absence of selfish designs. "We have no selfish ends to serve. We desire no conquest, no dominion. We seek no indemnities for ourselves, no material compensation for the sacrifices we shall freely make. We are but one of the champions of the rights of mankind. We shall be satisfied when these rights have been made as secure as the faith and the freedom of nations can make them."—(President Wilson, speech of April 2, 1917.)

III. VARIOUS PEACE PROPOSALS. (See *War Cyclopedia*, under "Lansdowne Note," "Peace Overtures, German, 1916," "Peace Overtures, Papal," "Peace Terms, American," "No Annexations, no Indemnities," etc.)

1. Offer of Germany and her allies (December 12, 1916) to meet their enemies in a peace conference (see "Official Documents Looking toward Peace" in *International Conciliation* for January, 1917). An empty and insincere proposal. They "propose to enter forthwith into

peace negotiations," but refuse to state any terms; on the other hand much is made of the "glorious deeds of our armies" and their "incomparable strength." The proposal evidently looked to a "German peace," with Germany and her allies triumphant.

Reply of the Entente Allies (December 30, 1916). The German proposal was styled "less an offer of peace than a war manoeuvre. It is founded on calculated misinterpretation of the character of the struggle in the past, the present and the future. . . . Once again the Allies declare that no peace is possible so long as they have not secured reparation for violated rights and liberties, the recognition of the principle of nationality and the free existence of small states, so long as they have not brought about a settlement calculated to end once and for all forces which have constituted a perpetual menace to the nations, and to afford the only effective guarantee for the future security of the world."—(*International Conciliation* for January, 1917, pp. 27-29.)

2. President Wilson's effort (Dec. 20, 1916) to elicit peace terms from the belligerents. (See his note in *International Conciliation*, for February, 1917.)

(a) Germany merely repeats its proposal of December 12, still refusing to go into details in advance of a formal conference.—(*Ibid.*, p. 7.)

(b) The Allies' reply (Jan. 10, 1917). Their statement of terms included adequate compensation for Belgium, Serbia, and Montenegro; evacuation of invaded territories of France, Russia, and Roumania; reorganisation of Europe on the basis of nationality; the ending of Turkish rule in Europe, etc.

"It goes without saying that if the Allies wish to liberate Europe from the brutal covetousness of Prussian militarism, it never has been their design, as has been alleged, to encompass the extermination of the German peoples, and their political disappearance."—(*Ibid.*, pp. 8-10.)

3. Widespread and intense desire for peace among the German people. Evidenced, among other things, by the fall of Chancellor von Bethmann Hollweg (July 14, 1917) following this declaration of the Reichstag (July 13):

"As on August 4, 1914, so on the threshold of the fourth year of the war the German people stand upon the assurance of the speech from the throne—'We are driven by no lust of conquest.'

"Germany took up arms in defense of its liberty and independence and for the integrity of its territories. The Reichstag labors for peace and a mutual understanding and lasting reconciliation among the nations. Forced acquisitions of territory and political, economic and financial violations are incompatible with such a peace.

"The Reichstag rejects all plans aiming at an economic blockade and the stirring up of enmity among the peoples after the war. The freedom of the seas must be assured. Only an economic peace can prepare the ground for the friendly association of the peoples.

"The Reichstag will energetically promote the creation of international juridical organisations. So long, however, as the enemy Governments do not

accept such a peace, so long as they threaten Germany and her allies with conquest and violation, the German people will stand together as one man, hold out unshaken and fight until the rights of itself and its allies to life and development are secured. The German nation united is unconquerable.

"The Reichstag knows that in this announcement it is at one with the men who are defending the Fatherland. In their heroic struggles they are sure of the undying thanks of the whole people."—(*N. Y. Times Current History*, VI, p. 195.)

It should be noted that the Reichstag has no power to conclude peace, or to initiate peace negotiations, or even to force the German Government to do so.

4. Pope Benedict XV attempts to promote Peace.

(a) His first appeal (Aug. 1915) lacked definite proposals and was without effect.

(b) His second appeal (Aug. 1, 1917) recommended: (1) "That the material force of arms shall give way to the moral force of right"; simultaneous and reciprocal decrease of armaments; the establishing of compulsory arbitration "under sanctions to be determined against any State which would decline either to refer international questions to arbitration or to accept its awards." (2) True freedom and community of the seas. (3) Entire and reciprocal giving up of indemnities to cover the damages and cost of the war. (4) Occupied territory to be reciprocally given up; guarantees of Belgium's political, military, and economic independence; similar restitutions of the German colonies. (5) Territorial questions between Italy and Austria, and France and Germany, to be taken up after the war "in a conciliatory spirit, taking into account, as far as it is just and possible . . . the aspirations of the population." Questions of Armenia, the Balkan States, and the old Kingdom of Poland to be dealt with in the same way.—In the main this was a proposal for the restoration of the *status quo ante bellum* [the conditions existing before the war]—a drawn battle.—(*N. Y. Times Current History*, September, 1917, pp. 392-293).

5. Reply of the United States to the Pope's appeal (Aug. 27, 1917). The Entente Allies practically accepted this reply as their own.

"To deal with such a power by way of peace upon the plan proposed by his Holiness the Pope would, so far as we can see, involve a recuperation of its strength and a renewal of its policy, would make it necessary to create a permanent hostile combination of nations against the German people, who are its instruments; and would result in abandoning the new-born Russia to the intrigue, the manifold subtle interference and the certain counter-revolution, which would be attempted by all the malign influences to which the German Government has of late accustomed the world. Can peace be based upon a restitution of its power or upon any word of honor it could pledge in a treaty of settlement and accommodation?

" . . . We believe that the intolerable wrongs done in this war by the furious and brutal power of the Imperial German Government ought to be repaired,

but not at the expense of the sovereignty of any people—rather a vindication of the sovereignty both of those that are weak and of those that are strong. Punitive damages, the dismemberment of empires, the establishment of selfish and exclusive economic leagues, we deem inexpedient and in the end worse than futile, no proper basis for a peace of any kind, least of all for an enduring peace. That must be based upon justice and fairness and the common rights of mankind.

"We cannot take the word of the present rulers of Germany as a guarantee of anything that is to endure, unless explicitly supported by such conclusive evidence of the will and purpose of the German people themselves as the other peoples of the world would be justified in accepting. Without such guarantees, treaties of settlement, agreements for disarmament, covenants to set up arbitration in the place of force, territorial adjustments, reconstitutions of small nations, if made with the German Government, no man, no nation could now depend on."

6. Reply of Germany (September 22, 1917). This was filled with the vaguest generalities. In part it consisted of hypocritical and lying protestations that ever since the Kaiser ascended the throne he had "regarded it as his principal and most sacred task to preserve the blessings of peace for the German people and the world"; and that "in the crisis which led up to the present world conflagration his Majesty's efforts were up to the last moment directed towards settling the conflict by peaceful means." With reference to the substituting of "the moral power of right" for "the material power of arms", and for the reduction of armaments and the establishing of arbitration, indorsement was given the Pope's proposals in such vague and general terms as to bind the German Government to nothing.

"The Imperial Government greets with special sympathy the leading idea of the peace appeal wherein his Holiness clearly expresses the conviction that in the future the material power of arms must be superseded by the moral power of right. . . . From this would follow, according to his Holiness' view, the simultaneous diminution of the armed forces of all states and the institution of obligatory arbitrations for international disputes.

"We share his Holiness' view that definite rules and a certain safeguard for a simultaneous and reciprocal limitation of armaments on land, on sea, and in the air, as well as for the true freedom of the community and high seas, are the things in treating which the new spirit that in the future should prevail in international relations should first find hopeful expression.

"The task would then of itself arise to decide international differences of opinion not by the use of armed forces but by peaceful methods, especially by arbitration, whose high peace-producing effect we together with his Holiness fully recognize.

"The Imperial Government will in this respect support every proposal compatible with the vital interest of the German Empire and people."

No notice whatever was taken of the Pope's plea for the giving up of occupied territory and the restoration of Belgium's independence. When reports were published in the German press that nevertheless the Government

was prepared to give up Belgium, the Chancellor denied this, saying (September 23):

"I declare that the Imperial Government's hands are free for eventual peace negotiations. This also refers to Belgium."

7. Formula of the Russian revolutionary Government: "No annexations and no punitive indemnities." Attempt of Socialists to promote an international conference of Socialists at Stockholm (Sweden) in September, 1917, on this basis. Failure of the conference because of (a) suspicion that pro-German influence was back of the proposal; (b) publication of proofs of pro-German and unneutral conduct on the part of Swedish diplomatic officials.

IV. WILL THIS BE THE LAST GREAT WAR? (See *War Cyclopedia*, under "Arbitration," "Hague Tribunal," "International Law, Sanction of," "League to Enforce Peace," "Peace Treaties," "Permanent Peace," etc.)

1. Conflict vs. mutual aid as factors in evolution. Are States of necessity rival and conflicting organizations?
2. William James' answer to the militarists' plea for war as a school to develop character and heroism; the existence of a "moral equivalent for war." (See *International Conciliation* for February, 1910).
3. Amicable means of settling international differences. These include negotiation, good offices, mediation, international commissions of inquiry, and international arbitration. (See A. S. Hershey, *Essentials of International Law*, ch. xxi.). About 600 cases of international arbitration have been listed since 1800. Importance of developing the habit of relying on these amicable means of settling differences.
4. Proposals of the League to Enforce Peace. These include the following articles, to be signed by the nations joining the League:

"(1) All justiciable questions arising between the signatory Powers, not settled by negotiation, shall, subject to the limitations of treaties, be submitted to a Judicial Tribunal for hearing and judgment, both upon the merits and upon any issue as to its jurisdiction of the question.

"(2) All other questions arising between the signatories, and not settled by negotiation, shall be submitted to a Council of Conciliation for hearing, consideration, and recommendation.

"(3) The signatory Powers shall jointly use forthwith both their economic and military forces against any one of their number that goes to war, or commits acts of hostility, against another of the signatories before any question arising shall be submitted as provided in the foregoing.

"The following interpretation of Article 3 has been authorized by the Executive Committee: 'The signatory Powers shall jointly use, forthwith, their economic forces against any of their number that refuses to submit any question which arises to an international Judicial Tribunal or Council of Conciliation before threatening war. They shall follow this by the joint use of their military forces against that nation if it actually proceeds to make war or invades another's territory without first

submitting, or offering to submit, its grievance to the court or Council aforesaid and awaiting its conclusion.'

"(4) Conferences between the signatory Powers shall be held from time to time to formulate and codify rules of international law, which, unless some signatory shall signify its dissent within a stated period, shall thereafter govern in the decisions of the Judicial Tribunal mentioned in Article I."—(World Peace Foundation, *Pamphlet Series*, August, 1916.)

5. Possibility of World Federation.

- (a) Some historical antecedents—the Holy Alliance (1815); the Quadruple, later the Quintuple, Alliance (1815); the Hague Peace Conferences (1899 and 1907); the Conference at Algierias (1906).
- (b) Success of partial federations—the United States of America; Dominion of Canada, Commonwealth of Canada, and Union of South Africa; the British Empire; the German Empire; etc.
- (c) Lack of explicitness in current proposals. "Internationalists hold that nationalism is no longer expressive of the age, but that federation is not as yet feasible; that the present sovereignty of states is detrimental, but that one cannot hope to change the theory suddenly. Hence, they propose internationalism, that is, a sort of confederation, a co-operative union of sovereign states, a true Concert of Powers. The individual schemes vary greatly and are usually not very explicit, chief emphasis being placed on faults of the present system."—(Edward Kriebiel, *Nationalism, War, and Society*, page 210.)
6. Indispensable elements in an effective World Federation.
 - (a) The triumph of democratic government. "A steadfast concert for peace can never be maintained except by partnership of democratic nations. No autocratic government could be trusted to keep faith with it or observe its covenants . . . Only free peoples can hold their purpose and their honor steady to a common end and prefer the interests of mankind to any narrow interest of their own."—(President Wilson, speech of April 2, 1917.)
 - (b) An international legislature. We have already the beginnings of a world legislature in the two Hague Conferences of 1899 and 1907.
 - (c) An international executive authority and an international army and navy.
 - (d) An international court of justice. The so-called permanent court of arbitration at the Hague (Hague Tribunal) not a real court.
7. The triumph of the United States and the Entente Allies over militarist and despotic Germany, gives the best assurance of the establishment of a League of Peace and the practical ending of war.

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to accompany a

Topical Outline of the War

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